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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a novel method for understanding how the Supreme Court constructs
identities. Applying Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality to pivotal Supreme Court
decisions which solidified gay identity were analyzed using Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v.
Evans, and Lawrence v. Texas. The results of this investigation show that the Court’s
construction of gay identity changed with each case, sculpted by what they perceived at the
time as most productive for American society. The work presented here has profound
implications for the future study of the Supreme Court and contributes to our understanding
of the workings of institutions in the modern world.
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Judging Sodom:
Gay Identity in Bowers, Romer & Lawrence
Introduction
This paper is about the Supreme Court’s decisions in three landmark gay rights cases.
It tracks the Court’s thinking as it changed from criminalization of gay intimate sexual
relations, in 1986, to reversing this decision in 2003. This paper is an analytics of
government, an analysis of the conditions that create specific institutions and ways of doing
things, how they emerge, exist, and change.1 This type of study seeks to explain the
emergence of a particular set of practices, for example, the Supreme Court’s analysis of gay
and lesbian sexual identity, examine the sources of the elements that constitute the practice,
and follow how these practices have developed into stable ways of doing things.2 An
analytics of government examines how these practices become institutions, how they create
and rely upon particular forms of knowledge and how the institution reforms itself and this
knowledge, over time.3 It looks to the ways in which the Supreme Court has been
instrumental in defining the ways in which the state has perceived, created perceptions, and
managed the sexual practices of Americans. In this thesis, I will argue that Supreme Court
decision-making in gay rights cases was based on how it perceived the productivity of gay
identity in each case. I argue that in each instance: Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), Romer v.
Evans (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Supreme Court, driven by the logic of
governmentality, came to form an identity for gay people based on what was most useful and
1

Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 2 nd Edition (London: SAGE
Publications, 2010), 30-31.
2
Ibid, 31.
3
Ibid.

productive for society. For this paper, the explicit construction of sexual identities means
what the Court has laid out within the text of its decisions. Implicit construction involves
what the Court has neglected to mention: the many assumptions about gays and straights that
are taken for granted. This is an important field of study because of the immense power of
the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Court has the authority to interpret the Constitution and
define what laws mean. As law professor James Boyd White puts it:
The criticism of opinions, on all these grounds-rational, political, and moral-is an
essential part of the activity of law. It is crucial to the legal practice, for it is on the
basis of such criticism that one will argue for or against the authority of a particular
opinion or line of opinions. The opinion is not merely an epiphenomenon to the
law…but is central to the activities of mind and character of the law as we know and
value it.4
Its decisions have also had an enormous impact on American culture by deciding such things
as who can marry whom, who is entitled to citizenship, and how different groups are allowed
to interact with each other in public. It has played an extensive role in defining group
identity for subcultures and how those groups are perceived in American society. For
example, cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education have helped
shape the identity of African-Americans. In Brown v. Board of Education, Chief Justice Earl
Warren described the position of African-Americans in the South under segregation; he
found that, “To separate [African-American children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in

4

James Boyd White, “What’s an Opinion For?,” University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 6, 1995, 1368.

2

the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”5
Chief Justice Warren goes on to state that public education, the cornerstone of American
society, teaches children everything they need to know to become fully formed citizens and
adults.6 Through this line of reasoning, Chief Justice Warren helped cement, in the broader
American consciousness, the sense that African-Americans were not as fully developed
people as white Americans because they have not traditionally received the same quality of
education. Relying on this logic, he overturns segregation in an effort to bring about equity
for African-Americans in education. Those in the legal profession are keenly aware of the
impact that the law has on the lives of those people that the law directly affects, but also on
the legal practitioners themselves, how they come to view the law and their place within it.
James Boyd White argues that, “the way [an] opinion is written has large consequences for
the future. It deeply affects and shapes the way we think and argue and, in so doing,
constitute ourselves through the law.”7 This is because the opinions of courts do not merely
reflect yes or no votes on the correctness of any given law, but are arguments that lay in
detail the justifications for their decisions. Studying the details and character of judicial
decisions is important because so much of what is constituted as the law and legal reasoning
has not come from statutes or even the direct text of the Constitution. Much of the law has
emerged through interpretations that have created doctrines and legal mechanisms based on
interpretations of these texts. Studying the Court’s construction of gay identity is important
because of the Court’s ability to control legal recognition and protection of groups of people,
as well as shape their own views on the law.

5

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), p.495.
Ibid, p. 494.
7
James Boyd White, p. 1368.
6
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I focus on three conceptions of gay and lesbian identity: the “criminal other” of
Bowers v. Hardwick, the “just like everyone else” of Romer v. Evans, and the “just-like
straights” identity of Lawrence v. Texas. How did the Court perceive alternative sexual
orientations in Bowers? How did this reading affect straight relationships? How did this
change with Romer and Lawrence? How did state intervention in the sexual lives change
under Lawrence? What new rights were granted? What new responsibilities were outlined?
These are important questions because the Supreme Court’s decisions have an impact on the
law, the decisions of lower courts, the decisions and thinking of members of Congress and
the executive, and they hold weight with the public.
The paper is divided into six parts. In the first section, I will discuss Michel
Foucault’s concept of governmentality and its significance for a study of the Supreme Court.
Second, in the literature review, I will address what other scholars have said about the
Supreme Court’s role in identity construction of groups. The third section will discuss the
Court’s conception of gays as criminals in Bower v. Hardwick. The fourth section will cover
the Court’s conception of gays as a damaged group in need of protection in Romer v. Evans.
Fifth, I will discuss how the Court has come to view gays as “just like” straights in Lawrence
v. Texas. Finally, I will conclude the paper with an analysis of my argument.
Literature Review
Legal opinions have broad impact on the political, legal, and economic lives of
people. Legal, political, and literary scholars have attempted to decipher the meanings of
these three cases and determine how they affect the legal and social standing of the gay and
lesbian community in the United States. Three major approaches have driven the scholarship

4

on gay rights. This literature review will examine a variety of scholars’ approaches to
analyzing the Court’s decisions in Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence. It will explore their
strengths and weaknesses, in comparison to my own work in order to place my study within
this research and to distinguish my study from other literature.8 The first focus will
investigate these Supreme Court rulings through the lens of queer theory. Queer theory is a
way of conceiving of gender, sex, and sexual orientation that has been adopted by scholars
from a large number of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Queer theory uses
“the post-structuralist figuring of identity as a constellation of multiple and unstable
positions… [and] analytical models which dramatize incoherencies in the allegedly stable
relations between chromosomal sex, gender and sexual desire” to reveal the socially
constructed nature of gender and sexual identity.9 In the second section, I look at how law
and literature scholars have studied Supreme Court decisions.10 What seems important about
their viewpoint is: their emphasis on narratives, character portrayal, and voice in judicial
opinions. This differs from the view of legal scholars who seem to be more interested in
studying the specific mechanisms of a decision.11 Queer theorists focus on the broader sociopolitical categories of subjects at play in a decision. Third, I look to legal scholarship on gay
rights that focuses on the specific legal mechanisms that govern decisions. Finally, I chart a
8

My research most closely resembles, and takes many elements from, queer theory research. Authors such as
Kathrine Franke and Teemu Ruskola have reached the same conclusion that Lawrence uses a “just like straight”
logic to come to its conclusion, see note 15. What these scholars lack, however, is a logical framework,
governmentality, that explains the motives of institutions. This, of course, is something that my paper possesses
and sets my paper apart from other scholars.
9
Annamarie Jagose (1996), “Queer Theory”, Australian Humanities Review,
http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-Dec-1996/jagose.html (accessed September 15,
2014).
10
This is an interdisciplinary movement from scholars of English, rhetoric, communications, and law that has
tried to study the law as a literary text. Prominent scholars in the “law and literature” movement include:
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Ronald Dworkin, Eric Heinze, Ian Ward, Robin West, and James Boyd White.
11
By specific legal mechanisms I mean the study of law that focuses on the specifics of legal reasoning such as:
the interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, the notion of
heightened scrutiny, a myriad of other things.
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different approach which focuses on the logic of governmentality present in judicial decisionmaking, and I point to arguments and ideas that these other approaches have missed.
In this first section, I will discuss queer theory. Queer theory concepts such as the
construction of social/sexual identities, performativity, and heteronormativity, have
influenced how these scholars interpret the decisions of the Supreme Court.12 This has
allowed theorists to shed light on the ways in which the courts and laws shape how we act
and how we perceive ourselves and others.13 Queer theorists have focused on the power
differential between different social groups, particularly the privileged position that
heterosexuality possesses in society. It brings to light the privileged position of
heterosexuality, especially the straight, married couple in terms of economic, political, and
social benefits afforded by the state. Examples of this are present in the tax breaks given to
straight couples who have children, but were denied to gay and lesbian couples with children.
In the court system, child custody invariably favors the heterosexual partner and by default,
inheritance only recognizes biological and matrimonial relationships.,,

12

Some of the foundational texts of queer theory include: Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An
Introduction, Vol. 1, trans. by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990) and Judith Butler, Gender
Trouble, New York: Routledge, 1990.
13
For examples of this look to Kathrine M. Franke, “The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas,”
Columbia Law Review 104 (2004), 1399-1426; Marc Spindelman, “Surviving Lawrence v. Texas,” Michigan
Law Review 102 (2003-2004), 1615-215; Teemu Ruskola, “Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What is Left of
Sodomy after Lawrence v. Texas?” Social Text 23, no. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 2005): 235-249; Thomas M. Keck,
“Queering the Rehnquist Court,” Political Research Quarterly 59 (2006): 417-419; Susan Burgess, “Queer
(Theory) Eye for the Straight (Legal) Guy: Lawrence v. Texas’ Makeover of Bowers v. Hardwick,” Political
Research Quarterly 59 (2006): 401-414; Unkown, “Unfixing Lawrence,” Harvard Law Review 118 (2005):
2858-2881; Janet Halley, “Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick,”
Virginia Law Review 79 (1993): 1721-1780; Janet Halley, “Romer v. Hardwick,” University of Colorado Law
Review 68 (1997): 429-452.

6

Queer theory has several important claims that are essential to it as a theoretical
paradigm.14 First, sexuality is central to the construction of political meaning and power.15
Burgess notes that political meaning is invested in the categorization of things and people
that are often thought of in terms of oppositional binary social categories, “e.g., gay/straight;
reason/desire; white/black; man/woman.”.”16 Each term in the pair is defined in relation to its
opposite and therefore their meaning are intertwined – their existence is dependent on the
other.17 At the same time an unequal power relationship exists between these binaries with
the minority being accorded “various forms of material inequalities such as unequal rights
and liberties.”18
Second, Burgess argues that identity is performative in the sense that identities,
including sexual orientation and gender, are created and perpetuated through acting them out
rather than a natural phenomenon that exist a priori within a person. Queer theorists argue
that these binary social categories are not natural but are, in fact, produced within specific
communities in specific historical contexts.19 For Burgess the “ubiquity of how-to books for
heterosexual dating and mating, as well as the painful adolescent memories that most people
have of inadvertently breaking one of the unspoken rules of gender and sexuality, suggest
that such norms are learned rather than given.”20 Third, political liberation can be best
understood as a parody of existing social relations and identities instead of an escape from
power relations. This is because of the performative nature of identity. No self or identity

14

Burgess, 403.
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
15
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exists abstractly in nature, so the struggle to find and maintain an identity on the basis that it
is natural presents itself as either naïve or potentially dangerous.21 Instead of a sincere
struggle to discover hidden natural identities, queer theorists seek to employ parody that
seeks to “dislodge seemingly natural assumptions about sexuality and gender be revealing the
shaky grounds upon which firmly enshrined discourse rests.”22 Burgess, drawing on the
example given by Judith Butler, points to the example of the drag queen who offers theatrical
and often highly exaggerated performances of gender and sexual roles which reveals the
constructed and performed nature of the roles.23 There are many sites of contestations of
political power, and popular culture can provide insights into the everyday operation of
political power that has the potential to transform it rather than merely mirror it.24
Queer theory legal scholarship has been focused on “how” questions.25 This calling
into question of how the governing of the “conduct of conduct” has been termed
“problemitization” by Foucault scholars.26 However, these scholars have mostly focused on
the macro-level cultural trends taking place in the Western world. They have mostly ignored
specific institutions and how they have played a role in shaping views on sexuality. They
have also placed less emphasis on why things occur the way they do.27 Instead they look to
how each individual part of an institution works to create the practice at hand: from
unemployment benefits to advertising. Dean contrasts this approach with other schools of
21

This shows up in many of the categorizations that humans have created but it often is most plainly visible in
the category of race and the supposed differences that exist between the races and the inherent abilities,
attributes, and defects that supposedly exist between different races.
22
Ibid., 404.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Dean, 28. For examples of this in the form of individual articles see Burgess, supra note 11; Teemu Ruskola
supra note 11; Kathrine Franke supra note 11.
26
Ibid., 27.
27
Ibid., 28.
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thought that ask: Who rules? What is the source of that rule? What is the basis of its
legitimacy?”28 Unfortunately, scholars relying on the works of Foucault do not fully
acknowledge the disproportionate power that institutions hold in comparison to individuals.
They get lost in the world of micro-forces that shaped our lives. It makes sense to employ a
broader analysis that focuses on a realistic appraisal of the place of institutions and their
effect on the lives of individuals. Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality helps to
resolve this issue by providing a framework that can be used to analyze these institutions and
their behaviors both on a micro and a macro-scale. Burgess’s analysis focuses on the specific
actions of the justices. The biggest weakness of this argument, however, is that it actually
takes the actions of the Court at face value. It does not try interpreting the reasons why the
Court has had a reversal of thought from Bowers to Lawrence. This analysis doesn’t fully
utilize Foucault’s later theorizing and consequently misses the point that the Court is not
merely acting out of ideological preferences. Instead, it is acting on the logic of
governmentality and developing governing practices that attempt to govern society in the
most efficient manner possible.
Second, I will discuss scholarship from the law and literature movement. Scholars
from the law and literature movement have also looked at the way in which the Supreme
Court has affected the lives of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) people.
These scholars have focused mostly on the narratives of LGBT people and legal history as
constructed in the Court’s opinions. As James Boyd White argues:

28

Ibid., 29.

9

The judicial opinion is a claim of meaning: it describes the case, telling its story in a
particular way; it explains or justifies the result; and in the process it connects the
case with earlier cases, the particular facts with more general concerns. It translates
the experience of the parties, and the languages in which they naturally speak of it,
into the language of the law, which connects cases across time and space; and it
translates the texts of the law…into the terms defined by the present case.29
It is these factors that make it important to study the way in which the Court tells the story of
the participants of cases. The way in which the Court characterizes these individuals can
reveal the explicit and implicit feelings of the Court towards these actors.
Law and literature scholars, such as Glenda Conway and Timothy Lin, have focused
on voice and narratives in judicial decisions.30 Likewise, Karen Tracey’s work has looked at
the way that judges in the New York legal system treated LGBT people as actors before the
courts.31 Tracey shows that the way in which judges have positively or negatively perceived
LGBT plaintiffs and defendants, plays a role in how judicial outcomes are decided. This
literary scholarship has drawn on the work of linguists such as Jorg Bergman to better
understand the structure of arguments within legal texts. 32 Bergmann argues that modern
institutions such as the courts have more and more been called on to resolve issues that are of

29

James Boyd White, 1367.
Glenda Conway, “Judging the Voices of Judicial Law,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 4,
no. 1 (1999): 159-172; Glenda Conway, “Inevitable Reconstructions: Voice and Ideology in Two Landmark
U.S. Supreme Court Opinions,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 6, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 487-508; Timothy E. Lin,
“Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases,”
Columbia Law Review 99 (1999): 739-794; Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, “Telling Stories Out of School:
An Essay on Legal Narratives,” Stanford Law Review 45 (1993): 807-809.
31
Karen Tracy, “How Questioning Constructs Judge Identities: Oral Argument about Same-Sex Marriage,”
Discourse Studies 11, no. 2 (2009): 199-221.
32
Jorg R. Bergman, “Introduction: Morality in Discourse,” Research on Language and Social Interaction 31,
no. 3&4 (1998): 279-294.
30

10

a moral nature. Bergman states that they “work within institutions that function according to
‘rational’ models and criteria, and they therefore are officially constrained to ‘demoralize’
issues couching them in terms of scientific or bureaucratic rationality. Professionals are
trained to take a ‘neutralistic’ stance with respect to the problems they deal with.”33 In
contrast to this supposed objective analysis, Bergman argues that the actual activities of these
institutions are grounded in strong moralizing frameworks due to the modern bureaucratic
necessity of assessing people and determining their relation to bureaucratic norms and
standards.34
The professionals that comprise the legal system realize that this occurs in their
discipline. Specifically, Judge Patricia Wald writes, “the conventional wisdom is that the
’Facts‘ portion of an appellate opinion merely recites neutral, predetermined ’facts‘ found by
the lower court…Yet nothing could be farther from the truth. When an appellate judge sits
down to write up a case, she knows how the case will come out and she consciously relates a
‘story’ that will convince the reader it has come out right. In the last century, the fact‘spinning’ function of opinions has become much more important…[Because] there is only
one account of the ‘facts.’”35 This is a departure from how 19th century Court opinions were
structured. During the 1800s both parties’ arguments were laid out in detail.36 It shows the
historically specific nature of institutional norms and their openness to change. Judge Wald
continues:

33

Bergman, 291.
Ibid.
35
Patricia M. Wald, “The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writing,” University of
Chicago Law Review, vol. 6 (1995): 1367-1368.
36
Ibid., 1386.
34
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This is not just a matter of being selective about which facts to emphasize (or even to
mention), but also a matter of characterization; the facts can—and indeed must—be
retold to cast a party as an innocent victim or an undeserving malefactor, to tow the
storyline into the safe harbor of whatever principles of law the author thinks should
control the case.37
Conway connects with this view; arguing that the justices’ reconstruction of individuals and
events, in cases presented to them, reflect the author’s view of them.38 The entire legal
system is then influenced by a particular justice’s, or group of justices’, view because of the
binding and far reaching nature of precedents.39 Through the lens of the majority opinion in
Bowers, authored by Justice White, the petitioner Michael Hardwick becomes
unsympathetic, threatening, and undeserving of constitutional protections because his
lifestyle threatens American traditions and values.40 This brings to light another insight of
literary studies: the study of the importance of extreme case formations.41 Extreme case
formations are those utterances that an author uses to convey the reasonableness of their
argument in adversarial situations.42 Extreme case formations are those sentence
constructions used to maximize the legitimacy of a claim being made. Pomerantz points to a
number of examples of this such as, “‘brand new’; ‘completely innocent’; ‘he was driving
perfectly’…”43 These are words added to a description that go above and beyond what is
needed to be said in order to remove all doubt about the argument or point that the speaker is

37

Ibid., 1386.
Conway, “Judging,” 166; Conway, ““Reconstructions,” 488.
39
Conway, “Reconstructions,” 489.
40
Ibid., 489-490.
41
Tracy, 214; Pomerantz, 219-220.
42
Pomerantz, 222.
43
Ibid., 219.
38
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trying to make. There are many examples of state courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme
Court using extreme case formations when arguing against gay rights.44 An example of this
can be seen in Justice White’s argument that only those rights “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition” are eligible for heightened constitutional protections.45 The key part of
this construction is the phrase, “deeply rooted,” because this reveals White’s belief that
sexual matters, outside of procreation and family rearing, are not a legitimate part of
American culture or history and thus beyond any state protections. From this standpoint,
White’s denial of Hardwick’s claims to the contrary can be seen as legitimate and reasonable.
While this literary take on Court scholarship is useful in understanding how the Court
has constructed the narratives and voices of people within the legal system, there are still
some gaps in this line of thinking. What this scholarship ignores is what has motivated the
Court to reach the conclusions that it did. Conway claims that “arguments justifying Court
decisions are not grounded exclusively in readings and interpretations of external ‘facts’ such
as precedents and the Constitution, but also in internal fictionalizations of the involved
principles.”46 What this paper provides is an alternative framework for explaining the logic of
the Supreme Court, which in turn provides an explanation as to why the Court came to a
particular conclusion in each case.
Third, I will review literature from scholars, mostly within the legal profession itself,
that root their analyses in the specific legalistic mechanisms that operate within the Supreme
Court’s decisions. These scholars look at the specific interpretations of the Constitution and
laws the Supreme Court has relied upon to make decisions. This sort of scholarship is most
44

Tracy, 214; Conway, “Reconstructions,” 501.
Bowers, 191-192.
46
Conway, “Reconstructions,” 491-492.
45
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heavily represented in law journals, but can also be found in social science journals. Authors
such as Bluestone, et al., have focused on the specific legal mechanisms that have driven
Supreme Court decision making in gay rights cases.47 “Loving Lawrence” discusses the
similarities and differences between Loving v. Virginia and Lawrence v. Texas, two landmark
Supreme Court cases dealing with the state’s recognition of various intimate partnerships. In
Loving, the Supreme Court held that anti-miscegenation laws which were prevalent in the
South and prevented mixed race couples from marrying were unconstitutional. The Lawrence
Court provided some recognition of same-sex couples by holding that sodomy laws were
likewise unconstitutional.48 The main focus of this literature is how the Supreme Court
comes to justify its decisions. The emphasis of this research understands the legal logic that
underpins these decisions and what they mean for future legal cases. This involves examining
the text of the Constitution, previous cases with similar circumstances and outcomes, and
how the justices have previously viewed the legal mechanisms at play in a given case.
While I share much of the same concerns and concepts as scholars in legal research,
such as Kathrine Franke and Teemu Ruskola, what differentiates their scholarship from mine
is their focus. Legal scholars, including those coming from the school of queer theory, focus
47

These authors come at the study of the Court from the traditions laid out in laws schools and study the Court
in this fashion. Gloria Bluestone, “Going to the Chapel and We’re Going to Get Married; But Will the State
Recognize the Marriage? The Constitutionality of State Marriage Laws After Lawrence v. Texas,” Texas
Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights 10, no. 2 (2005): 189-221; Pamela S. Karlan, “Foreword: Loving
Lawrence,” Michigan Law Review 102 (2003-2004): 1447-1463; Susan Ayres, “Coming Out: Decision-Making
in State and Federal Sodomy Cases,” Albany Law Review 62 (1998): 355-402; R. A. Lenhardt, “Beyond
Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage,” California Law
Review 96, no. 4 (August 2008): 839-900; Louis Michael Seidman, “Romer’s Radicalism: The Unexpected
Revival of Warren Court Activism,” Supreme Court Review 67 (1996): 67-121; Lisa K. Parshall, “Redefining
Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and the Concept of Emergent Rights,” Albany Law Review
69 (2005): 237-298.
48
By eliminating the ban on same-sex sodomy the Court helped to legitimize gays and lesbians by signaling the
end of its previously hostile stance towards gay and lesbian sexuality. By ruling in Lawrence’s favor the Court
put the weight of the judiciary behind the gay rights movement, or at least, it could be read in this way. This is
certainly the opinion of Justice Scalia in his Lawrence dissent.

14

on the specific legal mechanism at work within a text to try and understand their meaning.
Franke, for example, examines what the concept of “liberty” and “freedom” mean to Justice
Kennedy in Lawrence, and how those concepts are applied.49 I, on the other hand, am not
interested in the specific legal mechanism at work within these decisions. While I
acknowledge that they play a part in constructing the narratives and choices laid in these
decisions. The project that I am embarking on is an attempt to try to understand what
motivates the Court to act in the broadest sense possible. To determine what logic lies at the
heart of the Court as a state institution in the context of modern world. And pull back the
curtain and look at the gear and cogs that moves the Court. This is where Foucault’s concept
of governmentality comes in. They are studying the mechanics of the law where as I am
studying power and the Court. Therefore, governmentality lies at the heart of this study
because it is the tool I use to understand the Court as a state power in modern society. The
greatest weakness of this approach is that it fails to identify and examine the larger rationale
that has driven the Court and that is expressed through its language. It is true that the Court’s
legal interpretations and arguments will have the most impact on the law and the nation as a
whole. However, the Court’s stance, tone, and rhetoric when dealing with an issue surely
have a broader ideological impact as well. This is partly due to the perceived finality of the
decisions made by the Supreme Court. The Court creates precedents that impact all lower
courts and even lawmakers themselves. It often takes years or even decades for a decision to
be overturned by a future Supreme Court. In the interim, the previous ruling of the Court has
had a substantial legal, political, and social impact. The Court also possesses a great deal of
moral authority. For example, Chief Justice Warren’s psychological analysis of African49
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American children in Brown v. Board of Education has had a lasting impact on the way in
which race relations have been discussed over the last sixty years. Legal scholars continue to
analyze his argument that the lack of access to equal education for African-Americans is
detrimental to their mental and social development.50 The great impact of Chief Justice
Warren’s reasoning here is important to study, because it goes beyond a mere legal
explanation and shows how the Supreme Court views African-Americans as a group. The
impact of the Court’s decision is seen as having such a far reaching political, legal, and social
impact that it is essential to study the whole of these Court documents and parse out their
broader implications rather than a limited mechanistic analysis.
Uniquely, my approach will also utilize Foucault’s theory of governmentality. A
Foucauldian analysis consists of an examination of the three parts of an institution. The first
and driving force of an institution is its rationality of government: the way an institution
understands its tasks, its goals, and the things that it has set out to understand and manage.51
Through this understanding, an institution develops knowledge and truth of its subjects and
the subject’s place within the workings of government. Second, institutions develop
programs of government to carry out these rationalities and plans to carry out these tasks.
Third, in carrying out these programs, institutions deploy mechanisms, instruments,
procedures, and techniques used to achieve the desired results – what Foucault calls
technologies of government.52
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Other groups of scholars, such as queer theorists, have consciously adopted a
Foucauldian understanding while mainstream legal studies have unconsciously devoted their
energies to understanding the technologies of government. Precisely, they have focused on
the specific legal mechanisms at play within gay rights decisions and what the justices have
had to say about these technologies these cases and past precedent. The aim of this paper is to
study the rationalities of government that inform the decision making of the Supreme Court
and the traces of these rationalities that remain hidden within their texts.53 This is important
because of the lack of scholarship devoted to governmentalization of the judicial system.54
This study will focus on the components of this new rationality of government: security,
territory, and population. It is these three components of modern government that guide
government decision-making, although each institution has interpreted them differently.
Consequently, the study of this underlying ideology is paramount to understanding the
functioning of the modern societies.
Methodology: Governmentality as a Guiding Principle to Modern Government
Analytics of Government
In this next section, I chart out the framework for my thinking on the Supreme Court
which is an analytics of government. My mode of analysis in answering these essential
53
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questions relies on the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault and his concept of
governmentality. Governmentality is the conduct of conduct. This means that
governmentality is interested in molding the ways in which people conduct their lives: what
they eat, what they think, how they perceive others, and how others perceive them. Directly,
the government enforces this through law and the operation of government agencies.
Indirectly, it disseminates its perception of various peoples through the enforcement of
policy. Governmentality also involves the self-corrective behavior of individuals themselves
and the people that they interact with through broader cultural trends. This is true of any
division of government that governs what people do or how they identify themselves, such as
a judicial body like the Supreme Court. This paper draws upon a Foucauldian analysis to
understand the ways in which government institutions organize themselves, develop
understandings of people, and go about operating on the larger society. At the center of the
study of governmental practice is the need to analyze regimes of practices. Regimes of
practices are historically constituted ways of doing things. Social, moral, cultural, political
and economic practices operate based on the rules now in place, but they change over time as
new ways of doing things are thought up and adopted by society at large.
Institutions study these regimes of practices to better understand what is going on
around them as well as to better adapt their institution to the governance of the population
and the state. They do this by collecting statistical data, reviewing scholarly studies, and
looking back at historical examples. Gilles Deleuze tells us that there are four dimensions to
the study of regimes of practices: the field of visibility, the technical aspect of government,
the approach to government as a rational and thoughtful activity, and the formation of
identities. The first aspect, the field of visibility, regards what is the object of study by the
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particular institution. In these instances, the Supreme Court’s object of study is sexual
orientation, specifically gays as a group of people.55
The second aspect of regimes of practices is the technical aspect of government. This
relates to what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques,
technologies, and vocabularies the Court uses to constitute it and how it accomplishes its
goals. This is where a study of judicial mechanisms will come in. The way in which the
Court interacts with lower courts and briefs and how their interpretation of these documents
shapes their decisions. This deals with what aspects of these cases the lower courts have
decided to pay attention to, what facts they look at and accept, and the way in which the
Supreme Court has not challenged the lack of presentation of facts by lower courts. This also
deals with which briefs the Supreme Court’s decisions cite and how they interpret them and
which briefs are left out of the Court’s opinions.
The third aspect will be the approach to government as a rational and thoughtful
activity. We will need to ask a series of questions about how the Court operates and what
rationality guides its thinking: What knowledge, expertise, strategies, and means of
calculation or rationality are employed in the practices of governing? How these areas seek to
transform practices. How their logic gives rise to specific forms of truth. How these forms of
thought seek to make specific objects governable. The next goal for government then
becomes ensuring that these objects of study internalize the practices and forms of truth.
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The final aspect of regimes of practices is the formation of identities. Government is
concerned about the categories of people that exist and with the types of people they would
like to create.56 Institutions work to create environments, conditions, rules, and practices that
foster specific ways of thinking about an object, subject, or action. This is not to say that
these institutions can force people to self-identify with the personal and social traits that best
suit the needs of good government. Instead, these institutions are “successful to the extent
that these agents come to experience themselves through such capacities (e.g. of rational
decision-making), qualities (e.g. as having a sexuality) and statuses (e.g. as being an active
citizen).”57 Institutions act through these everyday environments to promote regulatory
norms that govern individuals’ behavior both explicitly, through rules, directives, and the
correction of others’ behavior, as well as implicitly through self-governance, the acceptance
of these ways of thinking and self-correction of thoughts and actions. In the end, I’m trying
to show that the Supreme Court’s underlying logic is the logic of governmentality, and thus
understanding governmental rationality can explain the Court’s decisions in Bowers, Romer,
and Lawrence.
Discourse Analysis
Next, Foucault’s notion of discourse analysis also plays a role in my thinking and this
will be elaborated in this section. The analysis of discourse was important for Foucault
because he understood “discourse as actively constituting or constructing society on various
dimensions: discourse constitutes the objects of knowledge social subjects and forms of
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‘self’, social relationships, and conceptual frameworks.”58 In order to understand how the
world around us operates, it is necessary to delve into the texts that constitute institutions,
places of power, and the elements of everyday life.
Foucault’s insights into discourse are important for a number of reasons: discourse
constitutes social objects, he brings to the fore the intertextuality of discourses, the discursive
nature of biopower, the political nature of discourse through power struggles that occur
through it, and the importance that discursive practices play in social change.59 For Foucault,
a discursive formation consists of “‘rules of formation’ for the particular set of statements
which belong to it, and more specifically rules for the formation of objects…‘enumerative
modalities’ and ‘subject positions’…‘concepts’…[and] strategies.”60 These elements of a
discursive formation work together and form cohesive texts that layout ideas in the modern
world.
The first element of a discursive formation is the object of the discourse. According
to Foucault, “objects” of discourse means objects of knowledge, the component parts of
various disciplines, sciences, or areas of interest that are taken as an object of study.61
Foucault views “discourse as constitutive – as contributing to the production, transformation,
and reproduction of the objects [and subjects]…of social life.”62 Discourse plays an active
role in the construction of our reality; it helps to give meaning to the social and physical
world around us and our daily interactions with each other as people. Discourse is not a
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passive reflection of reality that shines back at us.63 Objects are constituted in reference to
the text at hand and to outside texts. This means that objects of study have definitions
inherent in a given text, but also possess other meanings and aspects that come from other
texts that have described the object at hand. In the end, one cannot escape discourse of texts
because language is bound up in them. The interplay between intra-discursive, interdiscursive, and non-discursive formations and practices all play a part in constraining and
structuring arguments, what constitutes an object, and what can be said about an object.64
The second element of a discursive formation is its enumerative modalities. Norman
Fairclough defines enumerative modalities as those “types of discursive activity such as
describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations, teaching…each of which has its
own associated subject positions.”65 These enumerative modalities are historically contingent
and so the study of the social conditions from which they emerge is important.66 This means
that a judge “is constituted through a configuration of enunciative modalities and subject
positions which is held in place by the current rules of [judicial] discourse.”67 By taking up
Foucault’s position, it is possible to see that discourse plays a pivotal role in the construction
of social subjects. People do not merely use language that expresses elements of their social
identity (gender, class, race, and sexual orientation); rather the language we use creates and
reinforces the identities that we possess by perpetuating the elements of a social subject
through discourse.
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The third element of discursive formations is the formation of concepts. Concepts are
the “battery of categories, elements and types which a discipline uses as an apparatus for
treating its field of interest.” 68 These concepts help to form intra-discursive relationships
within a text, the structural arrangement of arguments, descriptions, and evidence. In
addition, they form the inter-discursive relationships between different texts, belonging to
“‘fields of presence,’ ‘concomitance,’ or ‘memory.’”69 Foucault defines a field of presence as
those statements that are taken from outside of the text, but incorporate into its discourse
what are considered to be true, involve description, use sound reasoning, or have essential
assumptions that are analyzed explicitly or implicitly.70 Foucault places, “emphasis on the
interdependency of the discourse practices of a society or institution: texts always draw upon
and transform other contemporary and historically prior texts.”71 Texts play off one another
both implicitly and explicitly as when an author argues a point. It is within this context that
concepts and statements are shaped. The field of concomitance consists of statements that
concern widely varying objects of study and belong to dissimilar types of discourse but are
active in the statements being studied in the current text because they serve to illustrate a
general principle, model, or serve as a higher authority on a relevant portion of the discourse.
For example, one could bring a discourse on cooking into a discourse of computer science
because of some relevant theoretical link between the two.72 Finally, Foucault defines the
field of memory as those “statements that are no longer accepted or discussed, and which
consequently no longer define either a body of truth or a domain of validity, but in relation to
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which relations of filiation, genesis, transformation, continuity, and historical discontinuity
can be established.”73 These are memories of old theories and ways of doing things that are
now considered wrong and outdated but still serve a useful purpose for making a point in the
current discourse. In the context of the modern Supreme Court, for example, it would be
appropriate in a discussion of Plessy v. Furgesson to make correlations to slavery, or other
legal rulings, interpretations, or thinking that plays some illustrative role in the current
discourse.
Foucault is interested in the contextual nature of texts. Likewise, Fairclough states
that “discourse analysis is concerned…with specifying socio-historically variable ‘discursive
formations’…systems of rules which make it possible for certain statements but not others to
occur at particular times, places and institutional locations.”74 For Foucault, there are two
types of context that govern the specificity of statements and texts: situational context and
verbal context. Situational context is the socio-historical situation or period that a text finds
itself in.75 Verbal context is a statement’s position in relation to the other statements in a text
that precedes it and follows it. The relationship between statements and their context is not
transparent.76 How it is interpreted varies from one discursive formation to another.
The final element of a discursive formation is the formation of strategies. Foucault
defines strategies as theories, themes, and explanations that shape the argument of a
discourse.77 However, the world in which a discourse exists places constraints on the
strategies that an author uses in any particular discourse. While there are certainly inter73
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discursive constraints on the formation of different lines of thought, here Foucault brings into
the discussion non-discursive constraints for the first time. For an example of non-discursive
constraints, Foucault points to the myriad array of non-discursive practices intrinsic to the
workings of the economy that help mold the boundaries of what is conceivable within
economic discourses.78 These rules for the formation of strategies govern what action can and
will be actualized.79 At the same time, discourse continues to play a pivotal role in
determining the constraints on non-discursive practices. Discourse, on the whole, is able to
overcome these constraints to play a dominant role in determining the realm of possibility for
both discursive and non-discursive practices.80 To illustrate this point, Foucault first points to
the function of discourse in a field of non-discursive practices.81 He cites the function of
economic discourse in the practices of emergent capitalism as an example of the power of
discourse to shape the future discursive and non-discursive norms and practices. Secondly,
Foucault points out the process of appropriation of discourse were the right to speak, ability
to understand, the right to draw upon the corpus of already formulated statements, and to use
these statements in decisions of institutions is unequally distributed between social groups.82
This means that dominant forces within the social system are able to construct arguments and
narratives that have a profound impact on everyday social practices and the realm of possible
discourse on just about any topic. Finally, Foucault points out “the possible positions of
78
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desire in relation to discourse: discourse may in fact be the place for a phantasmatic
representation, an element of symbolization, a form of the forbidden, an instrument of
derived satisfaction.”83 All of these elements relate to the “materiality” of statements.84 By
this, Foucault means the status or weight of discourse in relation to a particular institution.
All of this is relevant to actors who appear before the Supreme Court, the justices
themselves, and the broader public who are all shaped by how discourses are produced and
interpreted.
Explaining Governmentality More Broadly
Finally, in this section I give a brief overview of Foucault’s concept of
governmentality so that the reader will be familiar with some of the terms and ideas I use to
develop my argument. The study of governmental rationality is important to the present
study, because a thorough understanding of the government’s reasoning process can
illuminate why the state and its institutions adopt a policy. In his lectures, Foucault lays out
the three fundamental components of this new mode of power: governmentality, the
apparatus of security, and population. Governmentality produces knowledge through
political, economic, and the societal forces behind the market and trade. Theoreticians of
governmentality understood these social forces as the way in which people would act without
social constraints placed on them by the state. They focused on how people interact with each
other in their daily social and economic interactions.85 The emphasis on the processes of civil
society reduced the importance of judicial and disciplinary power, because both act upon the
population in a heavy handed way. Disciplinarity and juridical mechanisms do not fully align
83
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with the social processes of human life as they consist of a priori rules and regulations
imposed from outside on a population. They remain part of the modern state, however,
because they served to control the population within their assigned spheres of influence and
because they can be refined by applying the knowledge gained from studying the societal
workings of a population. Foucault’s concept of governmentality is an attempt to explain
why the government operates the way it does in the modern era. What governmentality
represents is the state’s attempt to govern people’s conduct both through direct interventions
and through convincing people to govern themselves. Governmentality is about applying
rationality and thought to the act of governing. The acts in this way because the state has a
responsibility to foster and protect its society, therefore, the state must take an active role in
managing a nation’s population in ways that will best promote the wellbeing of society.86 So
the study of populations and how to manage them lies at the center of governmentality’s
reasoning because its end goal is the welfare of the population. Governmentality goes about
this study of a population by both totalizing and individualizing its members.87 The state
must study the population as a whole through statics on a wide array of topics: birth rates,
death rates, diseases, income, employment figures, and so forth. The state however, also
analyses individuals through public education, census data, tax information, and any one of
the hundreds of forms and exams present within the state bureaucracy. Foucault states that
this is because “the means that the government uses to attain these ends are themselves
immanent in the population.”88 Since governmentality is the “conduct of conduct” this means
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that the best solutions to managing the interests of a population are through selfgovernance.89 When people take it upon themselves to govern their own behavior it benefits
the state. This is because it takes fewer resources to achieve desired results. This can lead to
less resistance because the population takes it upon itself to abide by social norms. This
means that the state will look at all forms of conduct in order to try to determine the best way
of convincing people to manage their own behavior. This includes specific institutions, such
as the law and the courts.
The law is created in order to control how people act. The Court explicitly controls
people’s behavior by deeming certain practices illegal, how the Court implicitly controls
people’s behavior through the way in which it frames its arguments in Bowers, Romer, and
Lawrence. The goal will be to show how the Court has used the law to respond to challenges
to accepted social behaviors over time.
Governmentality has a number of features that distinguish it from the concept of
sovereign power which had been the dominant modality of power during the Middle Ages.
Governmentality uses the techniques of security, statistics, to study and manipulate the
development of society. The target of power is not a territory, which had been the target in
the age of sovereignty; instead the target is the entire population of the state. Under
governmentality strengthening the state has become an end unto itself. The goal of the state
under this regime is to construct a government that can manage and produce a healthy and
prosperous population.90 People matter to the state in so much as the population is a
reflection of the character of the state. If the population is plentiful and productive, it can be
89
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said that the state is strong; and if the population is small and unproductive, it can be said that
the state is weak.91 This is where the Foucault’s notion of biopolitics emerges.92 The state is
interested in the population as “a set of coexisting living beings with particular biological and
pathological features, and which as such falls under specific forms of knowledge and
technique.”93 The state has a need to understand the population and how it self-organizes and
so it fosters institutions designed to study the population. This includes institutions that study
things such as public hygiene, sociology, criminology, and political science. The state then
uses the knowledge gathered by these institutions to develop techniques for government to
govern the population. This is the focus of biopolitics as the merger of natural biological
processes with the political practices of the state.
Until the emergence of governmentality, how well a sovereign ruled was judged on
how closely he managed the affairs of state – like that of the family with the sovereign as
head of the household.94 The family remains important in this scheme because it has long
been associated with the relations of power and knowledge.95 However, under
governmentality, the family emerges as an instrument of government rather than a model of
government.96 Foucault makes this clear when he states that, “whenever information is
required concerning the population (sexual behavior, demography, and consumption), it has
to be obtained through the family.”97 How the law and the courts constrain or mold morality
and sexuality, in terms of how it affects the family, emerges as an important field of study.
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This is not because of the specific prohibitions laid out in the law, but because it serves as
window into the broader message that the government is sending. The state’s message being:
who it favors, what practices it favors, and what ends the government is trying to promote.
The purpose of the present paper is to explore the emergence of governmentality and
its features in more detail, because governmentality represents the ruling form of power and
guiding ideology of governments in the modern era. The ideological emphasis on society as a
whole and not interfering dramatically with the systems of civil society has even had, I will
argue, an impact on the legal system and how courts function in the modern era. The
differing outcomes of Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence can serve as a model for how judicial
functions work in the modern state and what relationships it perceives as having a place in
civil society.
The state’s interest in examining and understanding all of the dimensions of a
population points to the reason why the Supreme Court chose to take up these cases in the
first place. Sexuality and the family remain important sites of contestation between the state
and other social groups within society, because it represents the most basic social formation
in modern society.98 The family teaches new generations how to act as responsible,
productive members of society, and passes on society’s norms and ideals regarding topics
such as religion, family matters, health, and morality.99 The goal of governmentality is the
stability of the system as a whole. As new problems emerge, the government responds by
managing the challenge these problems pose. Acting from this logic, the Court acted to shape
the perception of alternate sexualities and social groupings. Over time, the Court has
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responded the LGBT community’s demand for more rights in several different ways as the
social terrain around them has changed.
The rationality of government does not respect the judicial system in the same way
that sovereignty has.100 Foucault gives the coup d’état as an example of a time which raison
d’état ignores the law in order to preserve the state. The sacredness of the rule of law (God’s
laws, natural laws, and man’s laws) can be shed in times of crisis.101 This same disregard for
law exists not only in the early modern police state, but is also a characteristic of the modern
state. One only has to look at the working of the United States government in the post
September 11th period where even American citizens have been targeted for assassination
without any charges being brought against them.102 This opens up the possibility that
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traditions, such as legal precedents and due process, hold less sway than is espoused by
judges.
In an earlier epoch, under the rule of sovereignty, justice acted as a means of
deterrence and punishment. Governmentality has altered the legal system so that its primary
aim is no longer deterrence; instead it is meant to be a transformative institution that can
remold individuals into productive members of society. One of the things that distinguish
governmental rationality from other forms of social control, is its insistence that technologies
of power be applied not according to some abstract model or formula, but according to the
way that society really functions. The state possesses an incomplete knowledge of the
subjects it tries to control and this exposes the potential weakness of the state.103 Working
from this mindset, the government tries to avoid endeavors that would radically alter the way
in which society functions.104 This leads to skepticism of attempts at reforming governmental
or social relations.105 Normalization is an important tool in governmentality’s arsenal. It is
through this mechanism that institutions try to mold individuals and populations.
Normalization also works on people to get them to internalize sets of acceptable behavior
that ensure the smoother functioning of the larger society. However, this does not mean that a
concerted effort to resist power cannot change how institutions perceive social groups and act
upon them.
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Bowers v. Hardwick – Gays and Lesbians as Criminal Others
This section will track how the Court dealt with gay and lesbian identity in the
Bowers decision. First, I will chart out the history behind the Bowers case to provide some
context. Second, I will analyze the Bowers decision in order to survey governmental
rationality’s place in it. Finally, I’ll discuss identity construction in Bowers and how the
logic of governmentality worked to create a productive identity for gays and lesbians,
paradoxically, as a “criminal other” in the eyes of the state.
The History of Bowers
First I will look at the history of Bowers. The history of Bowers v. Hardwick begins in
July 1982.106 Michael Hardwick was a twenty-eight year old bartender at a local gay bar in
Atlanta. On the morning of July 5th Hardwick was issued a citation for carrying an open
bottle in from a bar called the Cove. He was helping friends remodel the bar. However,
Hardwick missed his Court date because the citing officer, Keith Torick, had written the
wrong date on the top of the ticket.107 When Hardwick appeared at the court house, on the
day Officer Torick had written down, he found out that he had missed his real court day.
Hardwick then paid the fine. In the meantime, a warrant for his arrest, stemming from his
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missed court date, had been issued to Officer Torick. On the morning of August 3, Officer
Torick was let into Hardwick’s apartment by a guest who had been asleep on the living room
couch. Officer Torick then entered the apartment and went to Hardwick’s bedroom and
discovered Hardwick and another man engaged in mutual oral sex. At this point, Officer
Torick announced himself and arrested both men for engaging in sodomy after Hardwick
protested that the officer had no right to be in his home. Later, Officer Torick would discover
that the warrant had expired three weeks before the time of the arrest because Hardwick had
paid the fine. The expired warrant, the questionable manner in which Officer Torick entered
the apartment, previous citizen complaints against Officer Torick, and his own views on the
constitutionality of sodomy laws led District Attorney Lewis Slaton to throw out the sodomy
charges.
Undeterred by this turn of events, Hardwick’s lawyers pressed on with a complaint to
the federal district court. Hardwick challenged the Georgia statute, on the grounds that it
violated the Constitution’s Due Process Clause. A married couple, friends of Hardwick, also
joined the case as John and Mary Doe because they wished to remain anonymous. John and
Mary Doe claimed that Hardwick’s arrest had a chilling effect on their own private intimate
life and that their fear of imminent arrest had prevented them from engaging in the
proscribed acts because the Georgia statute made it a crime for any person to engage in
sodomy.108 However, the federal district court dismissed the case based on failure to state a
claim.109 Hardwick appealed the dismissal to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. The court
agreed with Hardwick on the privacy issue. It also concluded that since Hardwick had been
108
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arrested he had standing to bring the case. On the other hand, the court ruled that John and
Mary Doe did not have standing. After the trial Georgia State Attorney General Michael
Bowers appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
According to internal Supreme Court documents the Court decided review the
Bowers case for a number of reasons. First, there were discrepancies between the federal
courts as to how they were ruling in these cases.110 Secondly, both the liberal and
conservative sides of the Court thought that they might be able to decide the sodomy issue in
their favor.111 However, when the liberal justices learned of Justice Powell’s ambivalence on
the issue they tried unsuccessfully to stop the Court from hearing the Bowers case, primarily
due to Justice Powell being a key swing vote in the matter.112 Oral arguments were heard
March 31, 1986. In a five to four decision, the Court reversed the 11th Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Court majority narrowed the question to whether homosexuals had a
constitutional right to engage in sodomy.113 They answered no. The Georgia statute
criminalized all forms of sodomy between all persons, regardless of gender or sexual
orientation. Justice White, writing for the majority, ruled that the appellate court had ruled
incorrectly in finding a constitutional right to privacy in regards to gay conduct, because “no
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual
activity on the other has been demonstrated.”114 Justice White found no connection between
Hardwick’s actions and the Court’s earlier cases that involved contraception, child care,
marriage, and other family matters. Justice White failed to see that the Court’s earlier
110
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decisions granting heterosexuals more freedom to control their own intimate lives could also
be applied to people with other sexual orientations as well. The Court’s decision to uphold
the Georgia statute meant that wherever sodomy laws existed, people would remain
vulnerable to prosecution whether or not the sexual activity was between consenting adults.
However, ten years after its decision in Bowers, the Court would begin to reconsider its
stance on gay rights.
A Discussion of the Logic of Governmentality in the Bowers Decision
Next, I will discuss the logic of governmentality as it works in the Bowers decision.
Followed by why the Court constructed gays a criminal other in the Bowers decision.
Although the outcome of Bowers v. Hardwick was negative for the gay and lesbian
community, the case remains important as the first time the Supreme Court had issued an
opinion on the rights of gays and lesbians. The main theme of Justice White’s majority
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick was that homosexuals are a criminal element within the
United States and therefore deserve no right to practice private, consensual sodomy.115
Through a review of local and state laws, going as far back as the pre-revolutionary colonial
period, Justice White found that every state had an anti-sodomy statute until the 1960s.
Furthermore, a strict reading of the Constitution found no mention of a right to engage in
sodomy, so Justice White has no qualms with upholding the right of states to enact anti-
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sodomy statutes. Although Justice White’s reasoning seems straightforward, we can ask why
he did not use a more nuanced reading of the Constitution.116 We can see more expansive
readings of the Constitution in earlier cases that involve intimate relationships and medical
procedures, such as Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Loving v. Texas (1967), Eisenstadt v.
Baird (1972), and Roe v. Wade (1973).117 Why did the majority refused to look at the fact
that the Georgia statue prohibited not just gay sodomy but straight sodomy as well? Why did
Justice White’s argument construct the identity of gays? These are important questions
because their answers illuminate the way towards understanding the workings of
governmental rationality within the Supreme Court.
The language in Supreme Court opinions plays a key role in determining how the
Justices view an issue. Justice White’s language in the opinion reveals how the Court viewed
gays. Justice White identifies Hardwick by name in the first sentence of his opinion.
However, White goes on to identify Hardwick as the “respondent” for the remainder of the
opinion.118 Judicial opinions often omit the name of the parties in cases.119 This may stem
from the Court’s aim to articulate the broader principles at work within a case. Here the
116
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Court downplays the importance of the individuals in the case. Still, this practice plays an
important role in how the case is constructed and subsequently read. This is an important
choice by the Court, because it dehumanizes Hardwick, and by extension all other gay
people, for the purpose of continuing to criminalize “homosexual” activity.
We can see that the Court has specific meanings for the words that it uses to describe
heterosexuals, homosexuals, and the social relations that relate to them. Heterosexuals are
people who come together with someone of the opposite sex, get bound up in marriage, start
a family, and have children.120 When Justice White compares these criteria to homosexuals
and concludes that they are not like heterosexuals at all. Next, Justice White examines the
precedents that have established privacy rights for contraception, interracial marriage,
abortion, and family. He recounts a long list of precedents and once at the bottom of it he
finds no connection between these topics and “homosexual sodomy.”121 Confirming this,
Justice White states that, “No no connection between family, marriage, or procreation, on the
one hand, and homosexual activity, on the other, has been demonstrated, either by the Court
of Appeals or by respondent.”122 Here Justice White is setting up gays as a criminal other.
They are an outsider from society because their lives do not resemble the expectations of the
majority. Justice White’s understanding seems to be that gays do not marry, have families, or
raise children. They are also criminal because sodomy is a practice that the Court intends to
outlaw. Based on Justice White’s reading, it can be argued that gays are a group looking to
obtain rights that they are not qualified to receive.123 Justice White continues, “Moreover,

120

Bowers, 190-191.
Bower, p. 191.
122
Bowers, p. 191
123
Bowers, p. 191.
121

38

any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of private
sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription
is unsupportable.”124 Here Justice White is following the logic of Carey v. Population
Services when the Court argued that the line established by Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe
was about procreation and not a notion of expanded sexual freedom.125 It is this group that
practice sodomy which the Court finds lacking protections. For the majority, sodomy is the
defining characteristic of homosexuality exemplified when White describes Hardwick as a
“practicing homosexual.”126 This links sodomy to homosexuality by stating that those that
are not practicing sodomy cannot actively identify as homosexuals. Heterosexuals represent
the default societal norm.127 The Court views heterosexual relationships as normal and so
they have worked to protect this type of couple’s place and privilege within the “the concept
of ordered liberty” that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”128 Justice
White’s concern for tradition has him turn to a historical overview of sodomy laws to
determine the historical traditions of an ordered sexual liberty in the United States and
whether homosexual sodomy conforms to these standards.129 Upon a review, Justice White
does not find this linkage and “to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ is
124
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at best, facetious.”130 Justice White uses the following review of American sodomy laws to
argue that “[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots” and because of this no
rights should be extended to gays:
[Sodomy] was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by laws of the
original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy
laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the
District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy preformed in
private between consenting adults.131
For the Court, the length of time a law has existed is important, because long held traditions
reflect the most successful social practices. The state is concerned most with promoting those
social practices which best benefit the social harmony and development of the population as
a whole. Gays are seen by the majority as perverse individuals who break both traditional and
natural laws that govern acceptable moral behavior since biblical times. In his concurrence,
Chief Justice Burger echoes Justice White’s concerns about traditional moral values stating
that, “to hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental
right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”132 From this perspective,
“homosexuals were a bad type of person.”133 Hence, when the Court looks to prohibitions
against sodomy, they look back at their ancient roots as a confirmation of those anti-sodomy
attitudes, a social practice, and a part of the natural workings of the moral mindset of the
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population as a whole. Chief Justice Burger makes this case when he quotes the English legal
theorist William Blackstone’s description of sodomy as “‘the infamous crime against nature’
as an offense of ‘deeper malignity’ than rape, a heinous act ‘the very mention of which is a
disgrace to human nature…’”134 The objective of the state is the ordered management of a
country’s population, as a group of people as well as a set of social and economic
phenomena, for the betterment of the state.135 We see the Court’s governmental logic
demonstrated by the majority’s insistence that marriage, the family, and procreation are the
defining characteristics of heterosexual life and that gays should be criminalized because
they break the social fabric.
The Bowers decision set about to determine what sexual norms would be accepted by
the state through the judicial mechanism. Foucault states that “it is the tactics of government
that allows the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state’s
domain, what is public and what private.”136 The state continued to hold a monopoly on the
power to decide moral issues in the United States and the Supreme Court, as one element of
the state, would make sure that the judiciary would continue to be relevant in deciding these
issues. Drawing from the greater society’s disapproval of alternate sexual orientations since
the concept was developed in the late 19th century, as well as more ancient philosophical and
religious considerations, Justice White’s opinion demonstrates the thinking that there could
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be no constitutional right to engage in the practice because it goes against the social norm.137
In this way, people will govern themselves by refraining from homosexual behavior or
concealing it, because they fear the social and legal repercussions of publicly admitting their
homosexual status. This is important for the state, because it promotes several perceived
social benefits: ensuring that the population increases through the creation of children,
ensuring less reliance on the state for social services through the institution of marriage,
promotes social harmony through the suppression of differences within the population, and
helps to promote public health through the suppression of more widespread sexual activity. 138
Social cohesion is something that the state wishes to promote and G. William Domhoff
argues, “Social cohesion [also] aids in the development of policy cohesion.”139 When these
social, economic, and political cleavages manifest themselves too sharply, governmental
response can be slow or almost non-existent due to tensions within institutions themselves.140
The state is also interested in the wellness of the public as a whole by tracking health trends
of the component parts of the population.141 Gorman-Murray and Waitt (2009) offer a deeper
understanding of social cohesion by examining Forrest and Kearns’s (2001) five factors that
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promote social cohesion, “(1) common values and goals, with shared morality and codes of
behavior; (2) social order…cooperation, tolerance, respect for difference…absence of
general conflict.”142 From this perspective, the Bowers Court seems to be abiding by these
interests. It provides historical evidence that Western society at large has had animosity
towards the act of sodomy. The Court provides for a strengthening of the social order by
affirming the outlawing behavior that is at odds with the community. And the Court, from its
perspective, promotes social solidarity with continued enforcement of sodomy statutes
towards reforming people’s behavior to conform to the standards of the heterosexual
tradition.
Historian Margot Canaday’s book, The Straight State, illustrates the state’s interest in
social cohesion and stability. In the book, Canaday studies the areas of immigration, military,
and social welfare and argues that during the 20th century with the rise of modern
bureaucratic governmental institutions that the state recognized homosexuality as a category
of individual and developed means to deal with homosexuality.143 In the area of immigration,
for example, the state has been concerned with the economic and moral character of the
people trying to immigrate to the United States.144 In the early 20th century, these
immigration policies served to promote heterosexual morality and gender norms by
scrutinizing the poor who attempted to enter the country, because poverty was thought to
promote perversion.145 This search for homosexuality or at least the act of sodomy amongst
the poor was also a way of preserving heterosexual gender norms, because homosexuality
142

Gorman-Murray, et al, 2859; R. Forrest and A Kearns, "Social Cohesion, Social Capital and the
Neighbourhood," Urban Studies 38 (2001), 2125-2143.
143
Canaday, 13-14.
144
Ibid., 22.
145
Ibid.

43

and sodomy were thought of as feminine.146 To exclude these people from the United States
was to ensure that the men of the United States acted like men and the women acted like
women. In the end, Canaday reveals how these interventions by state institutions have been
able to shape the meaning of homosexuality and the dominant position of heterosexual norms
in the United States.147
As the courts begin to take on cases that involve reproduction and intimate social
relationships, the courts must determine for themselves what best constitutes appropriate and
moral behaviors in these realms.148 In the Bowers case, the Court intertwines definitions of
family with heterosexuality.149 Justice White’s reading of precedents sees the family as the
arena for procreation and the propagation of the population when he states that “no
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual
activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court of Appeals or by
respondent.”150 Here Justice White is echoing Justice Joseph Bradley’s sentiments about the
family in Maynard v. Hill (1888). In Maynard, Justice Bradley states that “[the family] is an
institution in the maintenance of which its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress.”151 This illustrates that the composition and moral standing of the family has been a
concern of the Supreme Court and government at large for a very long time. In addition, we
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see that the state sees those that would advocate or practice another way of life as outside the
bounds of civilization as criminal others.
Justice White argues that these precedents did not layout a broader right to private
sexual conduct, stating that “the Court’s opinion in Carey twice asserted that the privacy
right, which the Griswold line of cases found to be one of the protections, provided by the
Due Process Clause, did not reach so far.”152 One can see Justice White’s line of thinking by
looking to the sections of Carey that he argues refutes a more open interpretation of the
privacy right granted by the Due Process Clause. In the Carey decision, the Court finds fault
with Justice Powell’s concurrence in Carey -- that restrictions on sexual freedom are only
justified if they can demonstrate a compelling state interest, but stops short of answering the
“difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes
regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults.”153 Here Justice White has
room to argue that the Court’s previous precedents don’t state whether the Court should or
should not proscribe certain forms of sexual behavior.
Because gays and lesbians are unable to conceive and raise children, they cannot form
the basic social unit: the family. In his brief to the Court, Attorney General Bowers takes up
this sentiment when he argues that “the [Georgia sodomy] statute most certainly does not
interfere with personal decisions concerning marriage or family life, the raising of children or
their education, or which members of a family will be permitted to live together.”154 This is
because straight couples, even though they are included under the Georgia statute, are not
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under the same sort of threat of prosecution as gays.155 In all actuality, the law is aimed at
curbing those elements that pose a threat to the social norms that have governed society.
From this reasoning, they are not entitled to constitutional protections whose aims are to
benefit solely families. We can see this explicitly in the brief of Attorney General Bowers
when he states that:
The common principles of this Court's privacy decisions have revolved around
marriage, the family, the home and decisions as to whether through procreation the
ancient cycles will begin again and, if so, in what manner the new generation will be
brought up. These rights have always been with us, and are part of us. Sodomy is not
now and has never been a right, fundamental or statutory…156
Justice White uses the Attorney General’s thoughts as the basis for his argument.157 Two
important points about the Bowers decision need to be examined. First, the majority reading
of Georgia’s sodomy law ignores the statute’s categorically neutral language and instead
finds it to be a homosexual sodomy statue.158 Justice White makes the point of the Bowers
case clear when he states, “The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”159 This new understanding made
it possible for the Court to ignore questions about straight sexual activities and to re-inscribe
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the Constitution with a “not like-straight” meaning. The Court deploys this “not like-straight”
thinking in its evaluation of gays as a class. This means that it views gays as different from
and not at all like straights. This leaves gays outside the bounds of the law and acceptable
society and therefore a criminal other. This lays out the governing principles of the Court in
regards to sexual relations. Positive sexual relationships are those that are vested between a
man and a woman for the purpose of procreation and the development of a family according
to governmental rationality.160 This is because the family betters the state as an economic and
social unit that it beneficial to the state. As Justice Powell argues, the moral fabric of the
family must be protected “precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in
this nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down
many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”161 This is so for many reasons: the
family provides a system of social support in tough economic times, it educates children in
the values and social norms of a given society, and the family provides a site for the state to
learn about the population.162 Lawmakers are concerned with "promoting healthy marriage"
as a "very important Government interest."163 Within government, politicians argue about
how to best tackle the economic conditions of women and families. Both conservative and
liberal law makers have tackled the issue of poverty, women, and their correlation to the
family:
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[Conservatives lament] if only more women could be brought within marriage's
protective domain…both by getting more women to marry, and also by strengthening
the core meaning of marriage as a life-long social and, especially, economic
commitment –fewer women would live in poverty…[Meanwhile liberal critics] posit,
[governmental policies] must tackle directly the crisis of female poverty, locating
both its causes and its potential solutions in, for example, education and labor
policies, rather than deflecting discussions of women's financial needs into the private
family.164
What this demonstrates is policymakers’ interest in women and the family as the most
important economic site in American society. State institutions are also supremely interested
in the education of citizens, as the Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) states, “There is no
doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to
impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education... Providing
public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.”165 Yet in Yoder, the
paramount place of the family is secured by ensuring that parents have the right to educate
their children with the beliefs of their cultural and religious identity.166 The state is interested
in the overall development of its citizens and as such takes great lengths to ensure that this
development is carried out.
Second, the Court rejects its own ability to challenge normative sexuality. Instead, it
buttresses the norm when it states that the case “does not require a judgment on whether laws
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against sodomy between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in particular,
are wise or desirable.”167 However, by narrowing Hardwick’s question to just whether a
fundamental constitutional right to homosexual sodomy exists, the Court has already made a
moralizing decision. The Court’s attitude is further reinforced later in the decision when it
states that it:
[Strives] to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable
in the Constitution’s text involves much more than the imposition of the Justices’
own choice of values on the States and the Federal Government, the Court has sought
to identify the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection.168
Yet it seems that the assertion that the Court remains objectively neutral in cases that involve
heated moral questions remains a dubious claim. Bowers is clearly a reflection of the Court’s
governmental thought process that privileges heterosexual relationships. The Court has found
that gay and lesbian behavior contradicts longstanding historical social norms and because of
this, it does not serve the state’s interest to extend Constitutional protections to said
behavior.169 Instead, the criminalization of “homosexual sodomy” continues to serve
legitimate and useful state interests because the statute adheres to the moral sentiments of the
majority of people.
The Court’s decision to overturn the Federal Appeals Court’s ruling was firmly
cemented in the rationale of government and the accompanying “not like straight” logic that
167
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defined homosexuality as a criminal other. The first instance of this “not like straight”
thinking can be seen in Justice White’s agreement with the Eleventh Circuit Court that the
straight couple, who were also a party to the case, did not possess standing before the
Court.170 Justice White makes the claim that because no heterosexuals are legitimately part of
the suit and Hardwick is a “practicing” homosexual, his challenge to the Georgia sodomy
statue must be read in terms of how it applies solely to homosexual sodomy. 171 The decision,
“says to [heterosexuals]: if your acts of sodomy are heterosexual acts of sodomy, they can be
forgotten, omitted, erased-not only not prosecuted but not remembered,” holding up
heterosexuality as the social norm and reaffirms heterosexuality’s unquestionable nature.172
The second instance of this “not like straight” and criminalizing logic lies in the Court’s
inability to find any resemblance between the expansion of sexual privacy rights granted to
heterosexuals in previous cases and the sexual privacy claims made by Hardwick. Justice
White quotes a long list of precedents but in the end concludes “that none…bears any
resemblance… [:] [N]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand
and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated.”173 As Conway pointed out
earlier, this is an example of the Court’s deliberate not understanding.174 In refusing to
acknowledge the logically broader implications of these precedents, and taking them to their
logical conclusion, this line of thinking produces a regulatory mechanism of sexuality based
on the heterosexual social norm by the Court. This is an example of the socialization and
scientification of sexual behavior that Foucault describes as a mechanism of knowledge and
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power in regards to sexuality.175 Canaday points out that “after the Second World War, an
increasingly powerful state wrote [its new] knowledge [of homosexuality] into federal policy,
helping to produce the category of homosexuality through regulation.”176 The juridical
apparatus functions to “screen the sexuality of couples, parents and children” and determine
right, natural, and permissible sexual behavior.177 This is exactly what the Court has done in
its analysis of precedent when it dichotomizes straight sexual behavior and gay sexual
behavior. Anchoring his opinion on a comparison between the Court’s decisions on family’s
inherent duty to procreate for the state, Justice White concluded, “No connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has
been demonstrated…any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that
any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated
from state proscription is unsupportable.”178 For the Court, the driving social unit of society
has been the heterosexual couple which comes together, in the end, to procreate and form a
family, anyone else is outside the bounds of society as a criminal other. Here we see that
previous precedents have supported this line of thinking in which the rights of couples has
been expanded to include access to contraception, the choice of spouse through the
elimination of anti-miscegenation laws, and the legalization of abortions. These cases have,
in the end, involved the state stepping in to support a broader range of family planning
choices for couples, which allows the population as a whole to make decisions about how to
run a family and how large a family should be up.179 Justice White supports this
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interpretation when he points out that precedent has set by Carey v. Population Services
International did not extend Constitutional protections to all forms of sexual behavior.180
Moreover, Justice White goes on to make the claim that the Court “[strives] to assure itself
and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution’s text
involves much more than the imposition of the Justices’ own choice of values…”181 Justice
White reveals a twofold line of reasoning. First, it shows that the Court is aware that the
public watches its decision-making, and because of this the Court must respond in a way that
is viewed as legitimate by the public. Second, it shows that the Court itself functions with a
governmental rationality, independent, or at least above, the ideologies of the individual
justices. Socialization plays a key role in perpetuating social, economic, and political
institutions. The justices, as members of society, have been socialized and those base beliefs
and ideas promoted by the state such as nationalism, religion, capitalism, respect for
authority and the rule of law surely plays a role in how they decide cases. On a conscious
level, the justices are keenly aware of their position in society and within their institution
which creates a belief that the state and its institutions that they serve should be safeguarded
and maintained. This is an important factor because many scholars have argued that the
Supreme Court operates, fundamentally, according to the justices’ ideological leanings.182
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However, what seems more important to the work of the Supreme Court is the project of
governmentality that the state has undertaken.
Productive Identity Construction in Bowers
The penultimate question is: why was it seen as productive for the state to criminalize
homosexuality? This has to do with shaping identities that the state finds acceptable. It also
has to do with what makes a productive citizen and the state’s vital interest in producing
productive citizens.183 The Court, in the case of homosexuality, played a big role in shaping
gay identity through the Bowers decision. As Conway notes, narrative in judicial opinions is
important because the Justices speak on behalf of the parties to a case and are, therefore,
responsible for crafting the image presented to the reader.184 As I have argued earlier in this
paper, the goal of the Supreme Court, as well as all institutions of the state, is the production
of productive citizens to build a stronger population and a stronger state. Thus, sexual
intimacy is important to the state due to the social ties that bind a family.185 In Bowers, the
Court came to the conclusion that that best way to produce productive citizens, in terms of
how sexual practices shape them, was to continue the criminalization and stigmatization of
sexual acts carried out by a minority of the population.
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From the perspective of an analytics of government, we come to the field of visibility.
In this instance, the Court’s object of study is gay and lesbian subjects. For the Bowers Court,
productive citizens come down to those that conform to the standards of traditional
heterosexual family. This means that a productive citizen is a heterosexual that marries, starts
a stable family, has children, is economically independent of the state, conforms to the moral
traditions of majority, and follows the rules and obligations that the state sets out. Nonproductive citizens are those people that don’t follow these economic, moral, social, and
political conventions. This puts these people in a strained relationship to the state and calls
into question their place within society and whether they might even be considered citizens
of the community at all, even if they still possess citizenship in the most technical sense.
According to the Bowers Court, gays are not productive citizens and the Court sees gays as
primarily a group of people who are defined by their engagement with the sexual act of
sodomy.186 Because gays exist outside the realm of the productive citizen, the Court acts to
penalize their behavior and brands them a criminal other. The Court constructs a “practicing
homosexual” as a man who engages in a sex act that has been antithetical to the traditional
moral teachings of Western civilization for millennia and is counterproductive to the state
because he has chosen not to participate in a relationship with a woman under the institution
of marriage.187
The Court’s choice to define gays as criminal others raises a number of interesting
questions. Why does the Court, in this instance, choose to criminalize this behavior? Why
then construct a narrative that portrays gays as criminal others? Ultimately, what the justices
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are hoping for by criminalizing sodomy is the correction of said behavior through societal
norms and self-government which represents the most effective tool of governmentality. The
state has an interest in ensuring that the family structure remains intact. As Canaday puts it,
“the state [is] concerned with using is resources to settle men… (think marriage, home, and
reproduction).”188 The logic of governmentality relies on the society to establish and enforce
norms. In the context of sodomy, the majority of people have, at least when Bowers was
decided, a negative view towards sodomy and homosexuality.
This brings us to the importance of social norms. Societal norms help shape the world
in which we live. They guide the way we do things and the way we interact with people on a
day to day basis. Why then are norms good in the eyes of the state? What purpose do they
serve? Why is it productive to pursue normative policies? As both Justice White and Burger
point out, norms that govern moral behavior have existed unchallenged for a long time.189
David Evans argues, the state must pursue policies that “do not subvert the absolute moral
sexual standards” of the community because otherwise the state might lose legitimacy.190 The
majority also favor these values because they have been long ingrained in the social structure
of society in one form or another. Traditional norms also exist because they have been
perpetuated through history. Therefore, these behavioral norms have mostly worked within
society, otherwise they would be discarded and as such, the majority of people tend to favor
them as ways of doing things.
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In the context of homosexuality, Justice White and Chief Justice Burger argue that
sodomy is outside the moral teachings that have shaped Western civilization and the United
States.191 Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe offers a glimpse of how the Court sees itself and
how it sees its role in maintaining the morals of society:
The inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns indicates that society
is not limited in its objects only to the physical wellbeing of the community, but has
traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as well…
Adultery, homosexuality, and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids
altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and
accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only
must allow, but which, always and in every age, it has fostered and protected. It is one
thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extramarital sexuality altogether,
or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when…it undertakes to regulate by
means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy.192
The Court clearly lays out the state’s interest in perpetuating its own moral agenda.
The Court acknowledges the role that law plays and the role the Court plays in determining
not only who can marry, but also what the content of that marriage will look like. The Court
refrains from tampering with straight couples relationships on the one hand and forbids
same-sex relationships on the other. The criminalization of alternative social and sexual
relationships attempts to foreclose other possible kinship relations.193 The practice of sodomy
breaks social and moral traditions and must be opposed on these grounds. The state
191
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accomplishes the introduction of norms and normalization through both a direct
pronouncement of what is and is not permissible through the law and through disseminating
these norms by way of the people themselves.194 The state is most successful when people
internalize these norms, correct their own behavior, and chastise the incorrect behavior of
others. From this line of thinking, it can be inferred that the Court believes that legal
prohibition of sodomy will drive people away from the practice.
Another example of the state’s interest in making homosexuals a criminal other can
be seen in government policies during the Great Depression when the state began to study the
social situation of American families. The state found that many couples were forced to live
with parents, communally with other couples, or to put off marriage all together due to their
inability to support themselves in these harsh economic conditions.195 The government
became concerned due to the overwhelming number transient men who, after failing to
provide for themselves and their families felt a certain feminization, were imbued with a
sexually charged wanderlust.196 The supposed promiscuity of men, coupled with their
identification as the household’s bread winner, becomes the primary factors that drive
welfare policies towards families. This concern for the economic wellbeing of the family
drove the state to pursue policies that pushed unemployed men out of the street and back into
the home and institutionalized those that could not be reformed.197 We can see that in social
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welfare and the courts, the maintenance of traditional family structures remains an important
goal for the state.198
The Court also plays a role in reinforcing the social norms that already exist. Public
disapproval of gays means that people from an early age will be socialized to disapprove of
homosexuality. This puts a lot of social pressure on gay people to conform to heterosexual
norms or be cast out of mainstream society and labeled a criminal. These social fears of
discrimination, in turn, act on gay people to self-govern and conform to the heterosexual
norm by marrying and beginning families with people of the opposite sex. The intention is to
reintegrate those individuals who might stray from social norms back into the
heteronormative family-oriented fold.199 The goals of these sorts of social programs are not
merely punish someone, but to reform them into a productive, ‘normal’ member of society,
often through the use of incentives.200
Another question emerges: does the limited judicial enforcement of sodomy laws
matter? No, enough enforcement of sodomy laws by the police keeps homosexual activity at
bay. The state, at one time or another, also enforced removal of gays from military,
immigration, federal jobs, and welfare ensuring that discouragement was felt.201 This worked
to keep gays in the closet or at the margins of American society. This also set the example for
society at large who perpetuated animosity towards gays, further ensuring their status as
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criminal others. Even if they are gay, the stigma will encourage them to remain closeted and
follow the productive heterosexual paradigm.
The modern reasoning of government is based on a rational and scientific
understanding of the nation and its population.202 By examining non-normative sexualities,
the Court codifies and strengthens them even in its attempts to curtail and control them. The
Court can give existence to sexualities by acknowledging their existence within the
framework of the state and by codifying definitions of sexualities in legal opinions. The
Court is able to mold interpretations and explanations in the way that it sees fit. In the context
of the 1980s, the Bowers decision makes logical sense according to governmental rationality.
What the Court is faced with, in its view, is a social group that evokes intense animosity from
the broader society. Gays and lesbians, especially in the context of the emerging AIDS
epidemic and the American Psychological Association’s delisting of homosexuality as a
mental illness barely 10 years prior, could be seen as individuals who cause a lot of social
upheaval by breakings traditional gender roles and sexual stereotypes and by being perceived
as potentially sick individuals, either mentally or physically. From a public health and safety
standpoint, it might be viewed as better to criminalize and marginalize this community, so
that real or imagined social and health ills are not spread into the straight community. Both
the possibility of disease and the breakdown of the traditional family represent a challenge to
the functioning of modern society which relies upon, more and more, the family to take on
the economic and social aspects of life that are being removed from the social welfare state.
Bowers represents the Court’s attempt to mitigate these negative trends by identifying gays
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as criminal others. In the next section, we will examine how Romer v. Evans focuses on how
Court’s amended governmental rationality would shape a new gay identity.
Romer v. Evans – Gays and Lesbians as Just Like Everyone Else
This section will track how the Court dealt with homosexual identity in the Romer
decision. First, I will chart out the history behind the Romer case. Then, I will analyze the
Romer decision and examine governmentality’s place in it. Finally, I’ll discuss identity
construction in Romer and how the logical of governmentality would respond by creating a
productive identity for gays and lesbians as a “just like everyone else” in the eyes of the state.
The History of Romer
Romer v. Evans emerged out of a 1992 amendment to the Colorado State
Constitution.203 Over the previous few years, a number of Colorado’s urban centers, Denver
(1991), Aspen (1977), and Boulder (1987) had extended protection from discrimination in
employment and housing to their LGBT populations.204 In 1990, Governor Roy Romer
issued an executive order barring discrimination based on sexual orientation in state
employment.205 This extension of rights to gay and lesbian individuals triggered a backlash
from conservative activists within Colorado. Colorado for Family Values then started a
petition campaign and placed a constitutional amendment, called Amendment 2, on the 1992
ballot which stated that the local or state government:
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Shall not enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have
or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination.206
At the polls, a majority of Colorado voters voted in favor of Amendment 2.207 A coalition of
citizens, unions, and local governments filed a suit in Denver District Court to enjoin the
implementation of Amendment 2 on the grounds that it was unconstitutional.208 After
reviewing the evidence, the trial court found that the plaintiffs’ case had merit and issued a
restraining order against the amendment.209 The defendant then appealed the case to the
Colorado Supreme Court.210 The Colorado Supreme Court took up the case and agreed with
the ACLU’s argument that the law created a barrier to the LBGT community’s “fundamental
right to participate in the political process.”211 The infringement of a fundamental right
caused the court to use strict scrutiny, meaning that the state would have to provide a
compelling interest to sustain the law. The court remanded the case back to the original trial
court where the challenge to the validity of the law would be heard. Colorado’s legal defense
of Amendment 2 consisted of four points. First, they made it clear that Colorado voters had
wanted to make a statement about the morality of homosexuality without resorting to the
criminalization of the intimate practices of gays and lesbians.212 Second, the state argued that
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gay rights should not be conflated with civil rights because the gay lifestyle was a choice
whereas a person’s skin color or sex was an innate characteristic of a person that could not be
changed.213 Third, the state argued that Amendment 2 protected the religious rights of
Coloradans by allowing them to exercise their religious beliefs through the people that they
hired for their businesses or who they provided services to.214 Finally, the state argued that
Amendment 2 deterred factionalism within the state due to the “deeply divisive issue of
homosexuality.”215 The state put forth the claim that issues of sexual orientation and
protections for people of different sexual orientations led to adverse political polarization in
the state and that upholding Amendment 2 would bring back social harmony by suppressing
the issues surrounding sexual orientation. The trial court judge found that the state of
Colorado did have a compelling interest in Amendment 2. However, he noted that these
interests were too disparately connected to Amendment 2 to survive strict scrutiny.216
Therefore, Amendment 2 was ruled unconstitutional and the Colorado Supreme Court then
affirmed the injunction that blocked Amendment 2’s implementation. From there, the
decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court
agreed and stuck down Amendment 2.
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A Discussion of the Logic of Governmentality in the Romer Decision
Next, I will discuss governmental reasoning as it works in the Romer decision. Then I
will discuss why the Court, in the Romer decision, constructed a gay identity that saw them
as just like everyone else. The negative or absent place that gays and lesbians occupy within
the law demonstrates the privileged position of straight people in the United States.217 The
state made it clear that it regarded heterosexuals as productive citizens, as opposed to gays.
The state preferred to extend to heterosexuals social, political, and economic opportunities
and advantages through mechanisms such as taxes breaks for married couples, protection for
parental rights, Medicare and social security benefits for widowed spouses, and a whole host
of other benefits. That was, and in many instances still is, the case.218 One has to ask what the
possible outcome of such an understanding is? Most heterosexuals had concluded that the
government was correct in this decision to treat them favorably, since it is in their best
interests.219 What is important here is that the Court has been in line with the general
attitudes of the population at large as well as the other way around. In contrast, gay rights
activists are trying to be granted these rights and so they must petition the state for them. As
a result, the gay rights movement must present itself in the most acceptable manner possible
217
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in order to have the best chance for success.220 They can appeal to the sympathy of the
majority in this fashion. This is to the Court’s benefit too because, as Justice White pointed
out earlier, the Court is constantly afraid of losing legitimacy in the eyes of the public.221 The
attitude of the population at large represents the success of institutions in shaping the
attitudes towards gays and lesbians.
Change in the social conditions of the 1990s, however, would pose a challenge to the
reasoning of the Court’s previous decision. Justice Kennedy’s majority decision in Romer
straddles a line between Bowers’ “not like straight” logic and Lawrence’s “like straight”
logic. The Romer majority continues Bowers’ “not like straight” logic for more benevolent
ends by seeking to remove the gay’s status as criminals, at least partly, that the Bowers
decision lay upon them. It accomplishes this through its departure from Bowers’ essentialist
view of gay behavior and identity. Instead, they rely on a nominalist view that gays and
lesbians are merely a named class who are not intrinsically imbued with defining
characteristics.222 For Justice Kennedy, gays and lesbians take on traits as they are actively
engaged with society and the law.223 As with straight people, Justice Kennedy views the
sexual orientation of gays and lesbians as merely one trait that they possess among many.224

220

Franke, 1419. Craig A. Rimmerman, The Lesbian and Gay Movements: Assimilation or Liberation?
Boulder: Westview Press, 2008, 133.
221
Justice White states that the Court strives “to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not readily
identifiable in the Constitution’s text involves much more than the imposition of Justices’ own choice of
values…The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution,” Bowers,
191 & 194.
222
Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 439-440.
223
Ibid. For Halley the Bowers decision focuses solely on sodomy as the defining characteristic of
“homosexuals”. Halley argues that, For the Bowers Court, this is all that is needed to be known about a gay
person, from this view they are too enthralled by the act of sodomy to consider the other dimensions that
construct a well-rounded view of an individual as a person: life experiences, culture, language, occupation, and

64

What we see in Romer is the beginning of a “like straight” logic emerging in Court
discourse. This differs from the logic of Bowers which set people apart according to sexual
orientation and gender. For the Romer majority, “the real content of the class is quite beside
the point: if the same discrimination were inflicted on blondes or burglars, the same
conclusion would follow.”225 From this quote, we see that the Court feels that gays should be
treated like any other group, the most obvious equivalent being heterosexuals, within society.
The State of Colorado made the claim that Amendment 2’s purpose was to merely to prevent
gays from obtaining special rights. However, the Court majority did not find this line of
reasoning compelling.226 The Court finds that even if Amendment 2 were to simply repeal
the existing protections for sexual orientation, it would not be a legitimate state interest.227
The Romer Court, however, notes that the scope was far larger than merely removing
existing protections. Instead, gays would be singled out and afforded no protections as a
group of people based on their sexual orientation, thus opening up the possibility of
widespread discrimination and no recourse to resolve it.228
The Court begins to reconsider the governmental relationship between the state, the
law, and sexual minorities. The Court interest in this is in biopower: the attempt by the state
to understand, influence, and control the biological world, especially human biology.229
Foucault states that biopolitics “aims to treat the ‘population’ as a set of coexisting living
hobbies. This s contrasted by the Romer decision where gays and lesbians might have a homosexual sexual
orientation but that is merely one aspect of an individual and does not constitute their whole being.
224
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beings with particular biological and pathological features, and which as such falls under
specific forms of” knowledges and techniques such as public health and hygiene, medicine,
sociology, psychology.230 Changing social attitudes over the preceding decade likely played a
role in how the Court viewed gays and lesbians in the Romer decision, including the
increasingly accepted notion that there is a biological link to sexual orientation.231
Governmental rationality is predicated on a number of distinct features: the tripartite social
order; the existence of rights, equality and liberty; and the state as the guarantor and protector
of citizens and rights, as well as constituting the domain of the political.232 The most
important of these, the tripartite social order is comprised of three components that make up
modern society: the private sphere of the family, the public sphere of the economy and civil
society, and the state itself.233 These facets of society are all interconnected but, at the same
time, distinct from one another. It is the task of the state to manage all three component parts.
The Court plays a role in this as the distinction between all three parts is clear, within the
law, and they are each treated differently by the law. As Foucault puts it, governing these
components of society is a matter of:
Ensuring that the state only intervenes to regulate, or rather allow the [natural] wellbeing, the interest of each to adjust itself in such a way that it can actually serve all...
[in a manner that ensures the] processes of a naturalness specific to relations between
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men, to what happens spontaneously when they cohabit, come together, exchange,
work, and produce…the naturalness of society.”234
The point for the state, then, is to guide society in a way that ensures the continued
functioning of society but not in a way that overbearingly regulates the bounds of liberty of
the individual and population at large. This emphasis on the naturalness of society and the
need to work within the bounds of it differs from; say the regime of feudalism and the logic
of sovereignty which placed subjects at the mercy of the goals of the sovereign and their
obedience to the law. This new governmental reasoning, imbued with the understanding of
the economy, has transformed the institutions of the state into agents of surveillance and
regulation of society and not merely the agent of sovereign juridical power. As Foucault
asserts, “a condition of governing well is that freedom, or certain forms of freedom, are really
respected. Failing to respect freedom is not only an abuse of rights with regard to the law; it
is above all ignorance of how to govern properly.”235 What, then, does this mean for the
Court? It means that the Court serves the interests of society and the population, in the most
efficient and productive way possible, when it constructs a constitutional framework that
emphasizes personal freedoms and participation in the society and the political system. To do
otherwise discourages people from being active in society and creates any number of
economic, social, and public health ills.236
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According to the logic of Amendment 2, the essential characteristic of homosexuality
cannot be ignored and consequently gays are denied special protections and must rely on
general legal principles to protect themselves as individual subjects before the law. With
Bowers remaining law, if it is rational to criminalize gay conduct, it is also rational to
discriminate the people most likely to engage in said conduct.237 Justice Kennedy, on the
other hand, moves past these issues by finding means to view the discrimination not through
the lens of any sexual orientation and by constructing sexual orientation as merely a “legal
personal relationship” and not a form of personhood.238 Justice Kennedy holds that even if
general laws might protect gays from discrimination, a claim he doubts, the injury that
Amendment 2 inflicts on gays is far broader than what the state claims it is.239 Halley points
out that Justice Kennedy’s concern about sexual orientation and sexual status “runs not to the
nature of the group but to the inferences about particularized conduct that an allegation of
group membership could sustain.”240 The mere mentioning or inferring that a person might
be gay can lead to discrimination for which no remedy might exist. This creates a slippery
slope that can lead to real discrimination and so the Court finds “nothing special in the
protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken for granted by most people
either because they already have them or do not need them.”241 Justice Kennedy realizes that
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in order to put gays on an equal footing as straights, to make them “just like straights”, then
Amendment 2 cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny even a mere rational basis.242
The Romer Court comes to these conclusions because of governmentality’s interest in
preserving the rights of individuals in relation to each other and the state.243 The state
protects and influences these interests by being the site of contestation for arguments
regarding the nature of rights, equality, and liberty in the political system. The major theme
in Romer, equality before the law, is also a major theme in governmental discourse. The
naturalness of society is taken for granted by the institutions of the state, including the Court.
By this logic, all member of a society, the population, are presumed to be equal to one
another before the law by virtue of being members of the state.244 The Court is well aware of
the principle that all citizens are equal before the law and acted in Romer to defend that
principle. As Justice Kennedy states, “homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class
with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental spheres. The
amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the
injuries caused by discrimination, and if forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.”245
The Court actually promotes social cohesion by removing a law that clearly targeted one
group and attempted to strip them of legal recourse from discrimination.
By coming down against Amendment 2, the Court also acted to further the
governmental goal of protecting liberty. Liberty, the ability to do what one pleases without
governmental interference, is seen as a social good by the rationality of government because
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it allows the population of society to work out amongst them the best ways for conducting
their lives and their interactions with one another. In this way, Amendment 2 interferes with
the governmental interests. According to Justice Kennedy, Amendment 2 strips gays and
lesbians from protections in public accommodations, housing sales, insurance, social welfare
and health services, private education, and employment.246 It also blocks any level of
government within Colorado from extending protections to gays and lesbians from
discrimination.247 Amendment 2’s intent was to block the state from putting in place
regulations that would prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, what the
wording of the amendment actually lays out is a framework that does not block antidiscrimination legislation in all cases but merely those that involve people who are defined as
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.248 General legal safeguards are denied gays by Amendment 2
and because of this a specific burden is placed upon them that no other group must endure,
this is regardless of “how local or discreet the harm” or “how public and widespread the
injury.”249 Halley provides a mundane, but salient example of how this injury could occur in
even the most innocuous of settings.250 Halley provides the example of a lesbian patron
trying to obtain a library card from her local library: with Amendment 2 in force the librarian
could deny the patron a library card on the grounds that “lesbians have no place in a public
library,” but at the same time, the librarian could issue the card anyway for fear that the
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patron may have legal remedies available in general law.251 Yet the library management
would be unable to form any coherent and generalized policy regarding the issuance of
library cards because they would be forbidden from addressing discrimination based on
homosexual status.252 Thus discriminatory policies that target gays make social interaction
within society arbitrary and difficult for the state to control. The state would become awash
in a sea of litigation from public and private parties which is something that the state wishes
to avoid. Foucault points to this when he notes that power “must be understood…as the
multiplicity of force relations…whose general design or institutional crystallization is
embodied in the state apparatus, in the formation of the law.”253 What Foucault points out
here is that the law represents the crystallization of power and force relations within society
thus enables us to see that the Court plays a vital role in shaping the bounds of the law. The
Court decision in Romer can be seen as one institution’s attempt to reclaim a bit of its ability
to govern which might be lost if Amendment 2 remained valid law. The law remains a useful
tool for the state to govern and shape the population and territory it controls accordingly the
law remains a vital tool in this endeavor.254 This being the case, the Court cannot validate the
constitutionality of Amendment 2 because it does not conform to its ideals of rational
government. Amendment 2 works against governmentality’s logic by eliminating the ability
of people to determine for themselves how best to interact with gays and lesbians. It would
restrict the ability of the government, individuals, and businesses to work out their own
policies towards gays and lesbians. Instead, the law works to decide for the population as a
251
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whole that gays and lesbians are undeserving of protections from those who would
discriminate against them. While the decision in Romer does not explicitly argue against the
Court’s earlier reasoning in Bowers, in regards to sexual liberty, it does spell the end for
Bowers’s narrow, anti-liberty sentiment with the Court. Logically, the law must be
overturned because it represents, in one sense, a return to the juridical sovereign
interpretation of law that narrows the law to a mere list of things that are prohibited, instead
of the productive force that the law is imbued with under the logic of governmentality. The
voters of Colorado had overstepped their rightful boundary in passing such a sweeping piece
of legislation, putting themselves into the position of the sovereign of old and using the law
as a tool of mere subjugation.
Governmentality sets its task as the ordered management of society. To ensure this,
Foucault states that “the basic principle of the state’s role…[is] respect [for] these natural
processes…take them into account, get them to work, or to work with them…The
fundamental objective of governmentality…will be state intervention with the essential
function of ensuring the security of the natural phenomena…”255 The way that society works
can be studied and what the state learns about society can be applied towards creating
systems that better manage it.256 What we can see in the Romer case is the glimpse of an
acknowledgement that the Court may be wrong in the way that it has treated gays and
lesbians. Justice Kennedy opens the opinion by stating that the state has a commitment to the
law’s neutrality where the rights of people are at stake.257 This can be read as an
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acknowledgement that there is room for expanding the rights of gays and lesbians. Justice
Kennedy goes on to argue that gays and lesbians are unfairly put in a “solitary class” that
easily curtails their private relations and public dealings.258 From this perspective “a
condition of governing well is that freedom…is really respected. Failing to respect freedom
is not only an abuse of rights with regard to the law; it is above all ignorance of how to
govern properly.”259 This opens up the opportunity to grant gays and lesbians more rights
than had previously been accorded them. We see the Court realigning the way it views gays
so that they can come back into the law and society.
Productive Identity Construction in Romer
Romer marks a turning point in the Court’s understanding and opinion of gay identity.
In Romer, the Court begins to see gays not as criminal others needing to be driven
underground or from the community, but as an equal member of American society. The heart
of the Romer case is about gays’ access to public accommodations. Colorado’s Amendment 2
holds to the standards set in Bowers and aimed to make it acceptable for the state and the
public to shun gays and lesbians. The law would have continued that practice of treating gays
and lesbians as criminal others. In this case, the Court takes up the mantle of acceptance of
gays and pushes the public towards this end through its authority.
The Court reconsiders the gay identity of Bowers, even if it does not address Bowers
specifically. The Romer decision is about strengthening the productive forces of the state.
The focus of the state is in strengthening itself and its population.260 Foucault states that those
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“who govern must know the elements that enable the state to be preserved in its strength or in
the necessary development of its strength...”261 Consequently when the Romer Court looks to
gays, it realizes that there is no need to define gays as a criminal other any longer. This is a
realization that the logic of governmentality, through the tool of normalization, can modify
gay identity. In the end, gays can become like everyone else. From the rationality of
government, this is a useful end, because the Court can alter gay identity, taking
unproductive citizens and making them productive members of society.
One motivation for this is an economic component to the normalization of gay
identity. As David Evans states, “the legalization of previously illegal and thus nonconsuming sexual status groups, for example, most spectacularly, male
homosexuals…[releases] considerable consumer power and [enables] the development of
considerable specific minority commodity markets.”262 To accomplish this end, however, the
Court must return gays to an equal footing within society by prohibiting outright
discrimination.263 This is evident by Justice Kennedy’s concern over gays and public
accommodation.264
Justice Kennedy continues his “just like everyone else” logic in his reading of
Amendment 2. Justice Kennedy states that “we find nothing special in the protections
Amendment 2 withholds. There are protections taken for granted by most people either
because they already have them or do not need them. These are protections against exclusion
from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civil
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life in a free society.”265 This demonstrates Justice Kennedy’s intent to put gays on an equal
footing with the rest of society and make gays just like everyone else. By transforming gay
identity into a parallel of the majority is to extend not only the rights, but also the obligations
of productive citizenship to gays. That is to say, if gays want to be treated equally, they must
not be “a stranger to the law,” but instead they must conform their behavior to the
majority.266 Accepting gays back into the arms of society is productive, because it sets up
gays to want to bargain for more rights from the Court. For example, the right to not be
discriminated against, for their intimate private lives to be decriminalized, and the state to
recognize their relationships. However, these rights will come with the price of molding their
image according to the dictates of the Court. We will see this strategy come to fruition when
we next examine the Court’s decision in Lawrence.
Lawrence v. Texas – Gays and Lesbians as Just Like Straights
This section will track how the Court dealt with gay and lesbian identity in the
Lawrence decision. First, I will chart out the history behind the Lawrence case to provide
some context. Second, I will analyze the Lawrence decision in order to inspect
governmentality’s place in the decision. Finally, I’ll discuss identity construction in
Lawrence, and how the logic of governmentality worked to create a productive identity for
gays and lesbians as “just like straights” in the eyes of the state.
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The History of Lawrence
First, I will look at the history of Lawrence. In 2003, the Supreme Court significantly
altered the legal status of gays in the United States. This reflected a larger cultural change
that had occurred over the previous 17 years which made gays a more visible and stronger
force within American culture. The courts too, have had an impact on how gays and lesbians
have been perceived and how they have perceived themselves through language used in
decisions pertaining to them.
The specific circumstances that surround the history of Lawrence v. Texas are less
clear and straight forward than the events of Bowers v. Hardwick.267 On the night of
September 17, 1998, Harris County sheriff’s deputies responded to a call that a man was
going wild with a gun in an apartment. When the officers arrived at that apartment they
entered and found John Lawrence and Tyron Garner engaging in consensual sodomy. After
they were detained, it became apparent that the man who had led the officers to the
apartment, Robert Eubanks, had phoned in a false police report. All three men were then
arrested; Eubanks for filing the false report and Lawrence and Garner for violating Texas’s
homosexual conduct law.268 However, all of the arresting officers each gave slightly different
accounts of the events and John Lawrence, Tyron Garner, and Robert Eubanks have never
given any public interview that detailed the events of that night. A full history is also unlikely
to emerge with the death of Eubanks in 2000 and Garner in 2006. This reveals one of the
267
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most interesting aspects of the case: the fact that it isn’t known whether any of the sheriff’s
deputies actually witnessed Lawrence or Garner performing a sex act.269 Although two of the
sheriff’s deputies, Joseph Quinn and William Lilly, still claim that they did witness the
acts.270 Regardless, Officer Carpenter contended that it was only when Lawrence began using
obscenities toward the officers and became uncooperative that they decided to enforce the
sodomy statute.271
After the arrest, Garner and Lawrence came into contact with the ACLU and they
agreed to turn their arrest into a test case before the Supreme Court. They pled not guilty and
were convicted by a Justice of the Peace. They were then granted a new trial before the
Harris County Criminal Court. They contended that the homosexual conduct statute was
unconstitutional. Their claims were rejected by the trial court. Upon appeal, their case
traveled to the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District so that Lawrence and
Garner’s constitutional claims could be heard. The Court of Appeals again rejected their
claims that the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The court held
that Bowers held precedent over the matter.272 The case was then appealed to the Supreme
Court. The Court considered three questions: First, whether the Texas statute that singled out
gays violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Second, whether the
statute violated the petitioner’s right to liberty and privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Third, whether Bowers should be overturned. In the end, in a five to four decision authored
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by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled the law did violate the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause, as well as violated Lawrence and Garner’s right to privacy. The
Court ruled that Bowers, having been too narrow in its analysis, should be overturned. With
this decision the Court struck down the remaining sodomy laws in the United States.273
A Discussion of the Logic of Governmentality in the Lawrence Decision
Second, I will discuss the logic of governmentality as it works in the Lawrence
decision. The Court and its perspective may have a greater impact on the thinking of gay
rights activists than the other way around. This can be seen, in part, through the utilization of
the legal system by gay rights activists as the primary vehicle for advancing gay rights.
Resistance to power plays a large role in determining how power acts upon the social body,
because resistance is constitutive of power.274 This interconnectedness between power and
resistance becomes evident by examining the arguments for gay rights articulated by gay
rights activists in the Lawrence case. Golder states that the law changes as parties interpret
and challenge the law, and novel concepts and understandings can emerge from
interpretation. This is accomplished through briefs and oral arguments. All sides of a case
develop their arguments, present their facts, and share ideas. The Court must then respond to
these parties and their arguments by adopting some, rejecting others, and developing their
own arguments. Further, both the courts and those who challenge the law respond to one
another and shape each other’s arguments and perceptions.275 Because of the interplay
between courts and respondents, the Court plays a role in determining what gay private life
looks like, in the form of adopting the “like straight” language of gay rights activists. In so
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doing, the Court realized that they had been too heavy-handed in dealing with gays.276 Justice
Kennedy takes issue with the Bowers decision stating that “to say that the issue in Bowers
was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about
the right to have sexual intercourse.”277 Here the “like straight” logic goes to work by
comparing gay sex to straight sex, in the context of a marriage, and finds that, because gays
are like straights, that gays are entitled to the same rights as straights. Gay relationships
might not be a marriage but they are similar enough to warrant some protections, from
Justice Kennedy’s standpoint. What we see with Lawrence is an attempt by the Court to
address some of the limitations of both the earlier Bowers and Romer decisions. The logic of
governmentality, which guides the Court and state institutions, must take into account how it
manages society because “it is always necessary to suspect that one is governing too much…
[The] imperatives of bio-political norms…lead to the creation of a coordinated and
centralized administration of life [and] need to be weighed against the norms of economic
processes and the norms derived from the democratization of sovereign subject of right.”278
Mismanagement of society such as being too restrictive can lead to harm for the population,
the economy, and the state. In this context, the Court has come to realize, starting with the
Romer and continuing with Lawrence, that it has mismanaged the Court’s relationship with
gays. Turning them into criminals and ostracizing them from the large community harmed
society as a whole and that “when homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself in an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
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discrimination both in the public and private spheres,” which is something that the Lawrence
Court is not willing to allow.279 Biopower is the composition of forces exerted by an
individual or institution on themselves or another that governs the biological facets of our
lives, including public hygiene, medicine, psychology, sexuality.280 This interest in the
biological functioning of the human species is found in institutions such as hospitals, schools,
in the social services, and in more abstract form, ideas such as sexuality. The state must
weigh the benefits of intervening in the daily lives of citizens with the need to control these
issues on the scale of the population as a whole. In the modern era, the biological becomes
one more realm of study for the state in its quest to address all problems affecting the
wellbeing of the population. When the state deals with problems such as sickness, disease,
natural disasters, displacements, and changes in the environment, it must collect and analyze
information to develop policies that address these problems, but do not unduly burden the
prosperity of the population at large. The governing rationality of the modern state rests on
the notion that social and economic practices must be allowed to develop without the
overbearing influence of government and state intervention, because people will naturally
come to the best solutions to their own problems. This notion comes out of the development
of capitalism and subsequent economization of the functions of the state, imbuing them with
the logic, reasoning, and analytical tools of capitalism which pushes the conclusion that the
more freedom that the state allows to exist, democracy being just one element, the better the
population flourishes and evolves along its own course. All of these factors being the case,
too much direct intervention by the state could lead to a decline in the productivity, wealth,
and security of the state. These sorts of bio-political issues are also best left for individuals to
279
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decide with the government intervening later and at the margins as to not upset their smooth
functioning.
From here we get to the juridical apparatus’s intervention into the sexual sphere of
life. For our purposes, an examination of how the Supreme Court has treated and shaped gay
identity, we begin with a look back at the Bowers decision. “All instances of governance
contain elements of attempt and elements of incompleteness which at times may be seen as
failure.”281 Bowers might be seen in this light and Lawrence is its correction. Bowers did not
stop gays, or straights for that matter, from continuing to engage in acts of sodomy. For the
majority of people committing these proscribed acts, the legal penalties associated with them
don’t cross their mind. Thus, the law fails to regulate and control what it had intended to and
in turn fails to govern. Justice Kennedy, in Lawrence, finds the narrow focus of the Bowers
Court on sex acts unappealing.282 So Justice Kennedy identifies other aspects of proscribed
relationships, stating that “the present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent
might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”283 This
immediately set the bounds for the sexual liberty at question in the case. This will not be a
case that lifts up every individual’s right to sexual freedom, nor will it comment on many
forms of relationship or sexual behavior. Instead, Justice Kennedy notes that Lawrence
involved the transcendent dimensions of personal liberty for him meanings, notions of love,
fidelity, and family.284 Bluestone states that “in proclaiming that the liberty in this case
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extends to more transcendent dimensions, Justice Kennedy, in effect, announced that the
issue presented goes beyond the issue of homosexuality.”285 Instead, it focuses on the real
purpose of all sexual and romantic relationships whichfor Justice Kennedy is coupledom.286
Couples represent a social good in the eyes of the state and so Justice Kennedy is
structuring his argument and language to emphasize that sexuality is not about sexual
gratification, but is merely one part of building a long lasting relationship between two
people.287 His end goal is the reconceptualization of gay identity, not as a criminal other that
exists outside of society, but as people who are like everyone else or just like their straight
counterparts.288 Having people enter into long lasting relationships represents a more
productive end and means of control than criminal penalty. Justice Kennedy argues that the
Bowers decision demeans the issue that it was presented with by unfairly narrowing the
scope of the case as to whether the Constitution protected a right to engage in homosexual
sodomy.289 Justice Kennedy notes that, “After Griswold it was established that the right to
make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship…
[Yet] to say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct
demeans the claim…just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”290 On the one hand, Justice Kennedy
claims that Griswold sets the precedent for sexual freedom beyond marriage, and on the
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other, he claims that sexual freedom, in and of itself, is possibly demeaning.291 While this
claim might seem perplexing, within the productive logic of governmentality, it makes sense.
Justice Kennedy is building a case for coupledom by tying sexual activity with relationships
“when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”292 Given that Lawrence
and Garner were not a couple and were engaged in casual sex makes this linkage between sex
and marriage technically disingenuous. For Justice Kennedy, the Court is not illegitimate in
its aims or methods when it strives to expand this coupled sexual liberty to gays and lesbians.
In addition, the question of a right to privacy in intimate matters is a major theme
found in Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Kennedy affirms that couples share a right to a private
intimate life without the interference of the government. He demonstrates the influence of
governmentality’s belief in allowing social interactions between people to happen naturally,
that is to say, at the discretion of the parties involved, instead of being directly controlled by
government.293 Relying on a number of historical studies on the origin of homosexuality as a
scientific and medical term, Justice Kennedy argues that no longstanding tradition of
prohibiting homosexual activity existed in the United States, because the term “homosexual”
did not exist until the late 19th century.294 Foucault, himself, confirms that homosexuality
emerged as a medical term and an identity in the 19th century.295 After making the argument
that laws specifically targeting homosexual behavior are an invention of the mid-20th century,
Justice Kennedy lays out the Court’s belief that gay and lesbian couples should have the
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same right to an intimate private life as heterosexual couples.296 Through this argument, he
constructs an acceptable gay identity. Justice Kennedy states gay couples exist and in the
same way as straight couples. Consequently, it would be unfair to criminalize gay behavior,
because in some instances straight behavior is not criminalized.297 Even if sodomy was
banned in all cases, the possibility of stigmatization and discrimination still remain for gays
because that is the act that gays are linked to in the broader culture.298 Here we see the
importance of normalization. What Justice Kennedy has done in his opinion is to create an
acceptable norm for gay behavior. This standard happens to be the same one placed on
straight couples. So if gays want legitimacy and recognition from the state, they need to
conform to norms of the heterosexual couple.
Productive Identity Construction in Lawrence
By the time that Lawrence was decided, acceptance and visibility of gays and lesbians
in the United States had increased.299 Likewise, they had become a far more active and vocal
group within American society. Given the increasingly pluralistic culture, driven by
individual wants and desires, morals can now begin to be driven like market forces. Not by
direct economic means, though that is present, but in the sense that there is a “market place
of ideas” where people are more and freer to choose what moral foundations they shall
ascribe too. Justice Kennedy writes, “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”300 By this point in

296

Lawrence, 567.
Ibid., 574-575.
298
Ibid., 575.
299
See note 219.
300
Bowers, 562.
297

84

time, it could be argued that gays deserve rights because they represent one lifestyle among
many.
At the same time, the Court still defines a normal life in relation to a heterosexual
standard. However, because Romer established that gays were, in fact, just like everyone
else, this opened space for the Court to manipulate gay identity. Homosexuality, then,
becomes just one facet of a person and they can still conform to the heterosexual norm, even
if their partner is of the same sex. Because of this, the possibility emerged to grant gays the
same right to form a couple that had been granted to straights.301 In response, a growing
number of gay rights organizations, attempting to win rights such as marriage from the
Courts, began to adopt an argument that gays were just like straights.302 Instead of pursuing
alternatives to marriage, gays shore up the heterosexual institution of marriage.303 From here,
we can see that Justice Kennedy latches onto the just like straights logic, and elaborates on
what he sees as the heart of the Lawrence case: “To say the issue in Bowers was simply the
right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just
as it would demean a married couple were it to be said that marriage is simply the right to
have sexual intercourse.”304 Kennedy’s like-straight analogy kicks into full gear later in the
opinion. Justice Kennedy states that, “when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is
more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
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right to make this choice.”305 Justice Kennedy conceptualizes gay relationships along the
same lines as straight relationships.306 What Kennedy has attempted to do, through this “likestraight” analogy, is reign in any possible conception of gay relationships that take place
outside of committed, monogamous relationships. He makes the comparison between straight
and gay couples here. This is the beginning of his “like-straight” analogy. Justice Kennedy
props up the right to engage in sodomy with the plank of marriage. What was once morally
unacceptable becomes acceptable by close association with coupledom. This coupling of
gays is beneficial to the state because it puts them in the same sort of social arrangements as
heterosexuals. Justice Kennedy realizes that coupledom can and does exist among gays and
lesbians and accordingly they can also form a family.307 Justice Kennedy states explicitly that
“our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education…Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just
as heterosexual persons do.”308 To reiterate, the family is important to the state because it is a
site of childrearing, passing on the standards of conduct of society, a place of social support
in hard economic times and old age, and provides stability in the lives of individuals. Carol
Pateman makes the case that the intertwined nature of conjugal and paternal rights of fathers
forms the basis of the social contract, and that it is the division of labor between men and
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women that allows men to enter the productive realm of the economy and civil society.309 It
is because of the development of capitalism and its destruction of the economically
productive nature of the family that the state is cautious about directly interfering with the
nature of family life. These social and economic factors make the family a desirable
institution for the state to promote, and if gays and lesbians would like to mimic this straight
institution, Justice Kennedy will provide them with the opportunity to do so.
Governmentality attempts to create social conditions where values and goals can be
determined by individuals. The social and sexual practices of the family, the most important
social unit, and the site for the daily renewal of the individual for the perpetuation of the
capitalist system are left to the individuals who comprise the family.310 Foucault writes that,
“the game of liberalism-no interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow their
course, laisse faire, passer et aller-basically and fundamentally means acting so that reality
develops, goes its way, and follows its own course according to the laws, principles, and
mechanisms of reality itself.”311 However, this supposed freedom is tempered by the social
norms that exist within society. Using Lawrence, the state granted recognition to the private
intimate lives of gay people, but only if they conformed to social norms. When gays selfgovern and conform to the norms of heterosexuality, the state benefits because the gay
couple will take on all of the obligations and responsibilities of a heteronormative
relationship: the long lasting bond, the family, child rearing, economic self-reliance, and
other stabilizing traits. In some sense, coupledom can be seen as a way of rehabilitating gays
and molding them into productive citizens – just like straights.
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Conclusion
Throughout this paper, I have made the assertion and supported with evidence that the
Supreme Court relies on the logic of governmentality in its decision-making process. The
Court’s understanding of governmental logic explains the differing decisions in Bowers,
Romer, and Lawrence. This is an important area of study, because the Supreme Court is one
of only three branches of the United States government and an important arbiter in the
American political system through its power to interpret the law. It is important to study the
language the Court uses in its decisions, because the “social world is experienced through
language and through the ways in which people label and value the context or environment in
which lives are lived. Language plays a major part in constituting social subjects, the
subjectivities and identities of persons, their relations and the field in which they exist”312
LGBT activists and nongovernmental organizations have also favored the legal system as one
of, if not the most, important site for obtaining recognition of the rights of LGBT people in
the United States. Thus, these groups have portrayed LGBT people in a particular light that
appeals to their judicial audience. This has lead to a narrowing of the acceptable bounds of
the sexual liberty due to the preferences of the judicio-political apparatus. A Foucauldian
analysis is important to the study of the courts because as a “methodology [it] sees economic,
social and historical phenomena in ceaseless change produced by complexly interwoven
contradictions arising from conflicting forces affecting the phenomena under
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consideration.”313 As a method of analysis, it is attuned to studying how institutions change
overtime, what opportunities are left unexplored, and what forces of power are being exerted.
Before continuing with a final overview of my argument, it would be appropriate here
to discuss a number of issues that this study does not consider, as well as possible limitations
that must be taken into consideration. First, this paper has not addressed the two most recent
Supreme Court decisions to deal with LGBT people. During the 2012 term, the Court
decided United States v. Windsor, which declared that the Defense of Marriage Act, passed
in 1996, was unconstitutional, and required federal recognition of same-sex marriages from
states that offer them. In Hollingsworth v. Perry, also decided in the 2012 term, the majority
denied standing to the appellants in the case; this allowed the California district court’s ruling
to stand and for California same-sex marriages to resume. The present study cannot provide
an explanation of these decisions because it has not analyzed them and because it is not
necessary in order to establish the general trend of Court decision making in gay rights. I
believe that an examination of these cases would reveal the “like straight” analogy used in
Lawrence, and the state would seem to have adopted a strategy of assimilating gays into
society, and thus making them productive citizens, but due to the time constraints I was
unable to widen the scope of this paper to examine the cases. The analysis present in this
paper is also not necessarily applicable to other types of cases that come before the Supreme
Court. The subject of study in this paper was gay identity as defined by the Supreme Court.
This subject has little to do with many other issues that the Court considers such as torts and
economic issues. However, Foucault’s theory of governmentality could still be a useful tool
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for political science scholars, as well as scholars from other fields, in studying the decision
habits of the Supreme Court.
Foucault’s notion of governmentality as a mode of analysis focuses on the
government’s concern with knowledge of objects of study, their mechanisms of control, and
the state’s rationality of government offers a useful tool for the study of the Supreme Court.
Governmentality provides a useful and novel approach in determining the Court’s thinking in
its decisions regarding gays. In the Bowers case, the Court held that the state had the right to
criminalize “homosexual sodomy.” The logic behind this decision was that gays, in no way,
resembled straights. Heterosexuals are important to the state and by extension the Court, in
this case, because the heterosexual couple represents the basic social building block of
American society. The family is a vital structure of the population because it is this
institution that provides the primary point for socialization of individuals within the society
and the most important productive and consumptive economic element. For this reason, it
was acceptable to treat gays as criminals because their behavior in no way resembled the
nuclear family. Gay intimate relations do not produce offspring, provide a space for child
rearing, or lead to long lasting bonds and so the Court could find it acceptable to effectively
criminalize homosexuality as a means of promoting, in their view, the heterosexual family as
a superior social structure for the development of society.
Romer, on the other hand, begins a reconsideration of the Court’s earlier thinking on
homosexuality in Bowers. The Romer majority comes to the conclusion that gays are like any
other group of people within the United States and, as such, should not be excluded from
participating in the political process as well as denied a place in the public and private
spheres due to their status as gay or lesbian. This can be seen as the Court considering the
90

incompleteness of the previous decision to consider a more productive end in dealing with
the question of homosexuality.
The Lawrence decision expands on the direction that earlier Romer decision began.
The Court embraces the conclusion of Romer and takes it a step further with a reversal of the
Bowers decision. The Court finds that gays are just like straight people, because it serves to
reinforce the logic of governmentality. The Court’s logic changed when gays began to
assimilate into the broader society and gay rights organizations took as their primary task
obtaining same-sex marriage. As part of their strategy to obtain same-sex marriage, these
organizations promoted the idea that gays were “just like straights.” This was a notion that
the Court was more than willing to take up and reinforce, because of the all the benefits that
that state would receive by having gays take on the same obligations and responsibilities as
straight couples. Therefore, all the previous decisions regarding straight families also apply
to the gay families. This is the case even if none of the parties to either case were a couple. In
the end, the Court finds it acceptable, and most importantly productive, for the state to define
a normalized identity for gay and lesbian people.
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